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DEALING WITH THE WORLD AS IT IS: 
REIMAGINING COLLECTIVE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
IBRAHIM J. GASSAMA∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[I]n many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military 
action today, no matter the cause. And at times, this is joined by a 
reflexive suspicion of America, the world’s sole military 
superpower.”1 
There is a specter haunting American progressives today when it comes 
to the use of American military power in international affairs. Bludgeoned 
over many decades by the misuse of such power, many progressives find 
comfort in the cold embrace of reflexive rejectionism. Unlike the foreign 
attitudes that President Obama referenced above,2 the attitude of American 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Oregon. The author would like to thank colleagues, 
Professors Michelle McKinley and Michael Fakhri, for their insights and encouragement, and research 
assistant Nathan Snyder who did terrific research and editorial work. To Muhammad Kenyatta and 
Keith Aoki, always. 
 1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace 
Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize). 
 2. See, e.g., America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-
findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project (“But, as we have documented, anti-Americanism is 
the case in much of the world, not just Muslim countries, and certain aspects of American power and 
American policy are central to this. First, there is a general perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally in 
the international arena, failing to take into account the interests of other countries when it makes 
foreign policy decisions. Our polling since 2001 has shown a growing perception that the U.S. acts 
unilaterally, and the war in Iraq has crystallized that opinion.”); Patrick Goodenough, Of the 15 
Biggest Recipients of US Aid, 14 Voted with the US Position at the United Nations Less than Half the 
Time, CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 17, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/15-biggest-recipients-us-aid-
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progressives is not ambivalence. Increasingly, there appear to be no 
circumstances under which they can see much good coming out of the 
deployment of American military power.3 Their skepticism extends well 
beyond the unilateral use of force, demonstrated by their strong opposition 
to an American role even in the United Nations-sanctioned multinational 
assaults on Ghadaffi’s forces in Libya.4 Arguably, this degree of 
skepticism about the use of force has reached epic cynical proportions.5 
The net effect is that American progressives have taken themselves 
effectively out of the dialogue on what to do concretely in the immediacy 
of persistent, widespread, and systematic assaults on the most vulnerable 
people in the world.  
 
 
14-voted-us-position-united-nations-less-half-time; see also Michael Chossudovsky, Obama and the 
Nobel Prize: When War Becomes Peace, When the Lie Becomes the Truth, GLOBAL RES. (Oct. 11, 
2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=15622&context=va. 
 3. See Eric A. Posner, Op-Ed., The Humanitarian War Myth, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901435.html; Ramah 
Kudaimi, Military Intervention Not the Answer in Syria, PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www 
.progressive.org/military_intervention_not_answer_in_syria.html; see generally Catherine Lu, Whose 
Principles? Whose Institutions? Legitimacy Challenges for “Humanitarian Intervention,” in 47 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS 188 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2006). For a 
discussion of historical debates around military intervention, see TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, 
HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION 1–28 (2007). 
 4. Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich went so far as to call the intervention in Libya an 
impeachable offense. Dennis Kucinich: Libya Air Strikes Could Be “Impeachable Offense,” 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2011, 4:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/21/dennis-
kucinich-obama-impeachment_n_838502.html; see also Press Release, Dennis Kucinich, 10 Reasons 
to Oppose the War in Libya (June 21, 2011); Gary Young, The Innocence of the Liberal Hawk, 
NATION (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/print/article/159449/innocence-liberal-hawk (“The 
question of whether the West should be involved in this region is moot. It has been intervening for 
several decades, arming despots (including Gaddafi), propping up dictators and ignoring human rights 
abuses. The question is how it intervenes and in whose interests.”); Matthew Rothschild, Obama’s 
Libya War: Unconstitutional, Naïve, Hypocritical, PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www 
.progressive.org/wx031911.html (“It is naïve to expect millions of Libyans to cheer as their own 
country is being attacked by Western powers. . . . And it is naïve to expect the world to go along with 
the ruse that this is not a U.S.-led act of aggression.”). But cf. Sahil Kapur, Progressive Caucus Splits 
on Libya, Abandons Joint Resolution Opposing Intervention, RAW STORY (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/03/23/progressive-caucus-splits-on-libya-abandons-joint-resolution-
opposing-intervention (discussing how the Congressional Progressive Caucus lost its organizational 
momentum); Juan Cole, An Open Letter to the Left on Libya, NATION (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www 
.thenation.com/print/article/159517/open-letter-left-libya (explaining that “[l]eftists are not always 
isolationists.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Tom Engelhardt, Washington’s Militarized Mindset: The Lessons Washington 
Can’t Draw From the Failure of the Military Operation, COMMON DREAMS (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/07/05-5 (“From Pakistan and Afghanistan to Yemen and 
Somalia, the evidence is already in: such ‘solutions’ solve little or nothing, and in a remarkable 
number of cases seem only to increase the instability of a country and a region, as well as the misery of 
masses of people.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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Ironically, the American progressives’ opposition to the use of force 
has not hindered American interventions abroad, UN-sanctioned or 
otherwise. On the contrary, the United States promotes its political, 
economic, and social interests, often mediated by military power, as 
robustly as ever.6 The principal consequence of such abdication is that 
interventions occur without adequate input from progressives. 
Progressives are increasingly reduced to complaining, protesting, or sitting 
back in sullen disappointment or anger as American human and material 
resources are deployed in the service of other agendas.7 They have not 
developed a strategy or capacity to influence the trajectory of American 
external interventions or to channel it to do the sort of work or produce the 
kind of outcomes progressives would prefer. 
Progressives must deal with the world as it is, replete with evil, plain 
meanness, depredations, absurdities, and the like, not all of it the result of 
American policies or actions.8 Demands that the United States first do no 
harm are a necessary but quite insufficient foundation for a human society 
congruent with progressive values. Failure to engage cannot be an option. 
The world sometimes needs the deployment of military power—and the 
use of American military power needs progressive involvement to enhance 
its capacity to do more good than harm. 
An earlier generation of progressives understood that a sine qua non of 
civilization and progress is an appreciation of the deeply interconnected 
nature of human experience—a realization that evil (such as the 
Holocaust, Congo under Leopold, Cambodia under the Khmers, and 
Afghanistan under the Taliban) cannot be allowed to flourish in one part 
of the world unchallenged.9 Violence and misery respect no human 
borders, natural or artificial. Thus one of the most important commitments 
generated by progressives of the post-World War II era was not to let 
atrocities proceed with security within artificial boundaries.10 That 
 
 
 6. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER (2002); CLYDE 
PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION (2003); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE (2004); FRED 
KAPLAN, DAYDREAM BELIEVERS (2008). 
 7. See sources cited supra notes 3–4. 
 8. Ibrahim J. Gassama, It’s a Miserable World After All, OREGONLIVE.COM (Oct. 23, 2011), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/10/its_a_miserable_world_after_al.html. 
 9. NORRIE MACQUEEN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15–18 
(2011). “[T]he United Nations began with a particularly sharp sense of its humanitarian 
responsibilities.” Id. at 15. See also ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST (1998). 
 10. MACQUEEN, supra note 9, at 17–18 (“The Genocide Convention of 1948, for example, was 
one of the [UN’s] first contributions to the onward development of international law even if the 
proposal for a court to enforce it failed. The Convention committed its signatories to take action—
Washington University Open Scholarship
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generation of progressives advanced a commitment to confronting evil. 
This was not a conservative notion. The Genocide Convention,11 the 
articulation of a category of crimes against humanity,12 the creation of the 
United Nations with a Security Council empowered to counter threats to 
international peace and security,13 and the development of an international 
bill of rights14 all attest to this salutary progressive tradition. The Cold 
War pushed this flowering of progressive re-imagination of international 
relations to the side. Conservatism’s internationalist partner, realpolitik,15 
with its dyspeptic and jaundiced view of humanity, took hold.16 Hence we 
 
 
including by military intervention if necessary—to prevent or stop the crime of genocide wherever it 
took place.”). 
 11. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 8 
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1845, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 
279. These crimes are currently codified in the foundational document of the International Criminal 
Court. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998). 
 13. U.N. Charter arts. 24, 34, 36–38, 38–51, 54. 
 14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 15. A good description of realpolitik can be found in SARA STEINMETZ, DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1994):  
Adherents of realpolitik assume states to be central actors in an anarchic and “essentially 
competitive” environment. Rationality, rather than the individual preferences of decision-
makers or an assumed universal morality, guides foreign policy decisions. Such decisions are 
calculated in “terms of interest defined as power,” where power is used as an end in itself, or 
as a means of achieving other national interest goals. 
Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). 
 16. See JUKKA LEINONEN, BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR AS A PHENOMENON OF REALPOLITIK 
(2012). Leinonen discusses the role of realpolitik in the formation of the Cold War: “Insofar as the 
United States foreign relations after the Second World War were marked by [Secretary of State] 
Byrnes’s foreign policy, they involved a balancing act typical of realpolitik between the demands of 
publicity, party politics and foreign powers.” Id. at 351. Furthermore, Leinonen notes, “[D]uring 
Byrnes’s secretaryship configurations in the field of power politics were created that could not 
subsequently be dismantled. Behind the birth of these configurations lay a new implementation of 
realpolitik, which in the real world was manifested in a dialogue between the Soviets’ security policies 
and Byrnes’s foreign policy.” Id. at 357. Therefore, he concludes, “The elements of the Cold War were 
founded on the inevitable collision of the political realism of both sides . . . .” Id. at 358. This analysis 
has interesting implications for the time period: 
An interpretation of Byrnes’s political actions shows the origins of the Cold War mostly as a 
kind of farce, in which both sides very naively believed in the ability of realpolitik to produce 
peace arrangements. Thus the process was defined above all by a drift into an irreversible 
situation in the field of power politics. . . . 
The origins of the Cold War as a phenomenon of realpolitik were defined by the execution of 
realpolitik on the one hand as the art of the possible and on other hand as the art of the 
impossible . . . . The connection between Byrnes’s actions, realpolitik and the origins of the 
Cold War becomes evident as a type of game theory. Since becoming involved in the game 
meant at the same time drifting into the Cold War, realpolitik and the transition to the Cold 
War became mutually sustaining elements.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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find ourselves in a world marked by varying measures of ambivalence, 
indifference, and hostility to the plight of the most fragile among us. 
This Article first argues for recognizing not just the legal and political 
right to engage in humanitarian intervention, but also a legal obligation or 
duty on the part of the international community to respond with armed 
force when necessary to ameliorate massive human tragedies or threats of 
such calamities even where the acquiescence of national governments or 
those in effective control of the area may be lacking. The argument for a 
duty adopts a more prescriptive sense of responsibility than the 
international consensus that is emerging with the “responsibility to 
protect” doctrine.17 This argument is especially targeted toward those who 
see themselves as progressives or liberals within present-day American 
society and have a general aversion to using military force in international 
affairs. With appreciation of the pitfalls and challenges of such a position, 
the Article outlines the case for the right and the duty of the global 
community to intervene collectively to protect the innocent where national 
governments and the ordinary structures18 of the international community 
have failed. The argument here follows Professor Kok-Chor Tan’s 
argument for the moral obligation to protect.19 
Secondly, the Article argues that the legal and political legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention—or its current iteration, the responsibility to 
protect—should be predicated upon the international community’s 
acceptance of a broader collective responsibility, better stated as a duty, to 
assist those who are imperiled under less spectacular conditions of misery. 
In short, a legitimate collective right or duty to intervene across sovereign 
jurisdiction under crisis conditions must be founded upon an acceptance of 
broader responsibility for conditions that do not meet current definitions of 
“crisis.” It should be emphasized that this acceptance of collective 
responsibility derives not from charitable sentiments, but from a clear 
recognition of obligations based on profit from historical and ongoing 
injurious policies and practices.20 The world as it is today did not just 
 
 
Id. at 358–59. See also NYE, JR., supra note 6. 
 17. See discussion infra Part V. 
 18. By “ordinary structures,” I am referring to various arms of the United Nations, the World 
Bank, regional entities, and even humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations.  
 19. See Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty To Protect, in 47 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS, 
supra note 3, at 84. 
 20. See generally WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1972); SAMIR 
AMIN, NEO-COLONIALISM IN WEST AFRICA (1973); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR 
AFRICA (1991); BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN (1992); PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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happen. It is the result of conscious policies and practices that extend over 
the ages. A common humanity, as well as recognition of history’s grossly 
unequal distribution of benefits and burdens, compels a communal 
political responsibility to engage the causes and the manifestations of 
immense suffering.21 Such engagements must allow for the possible use of 
force against extreme and totalizing violations of human dignity, but only 
as long as force is part of a package that also covers communal 
responsibility for dealing with enduring structures of misery. This 
argument benefits substantially from the work done by Iris Marion Young 
and Thomas Pogge.22 
The analysis is informed by critical concerns such as the indeterminacy 
and incoherence of legal principles and policies. It accepts the limits of our 
capacity to fully comprehend, let alone devise solutions to, longstanding 
and intractable issues implicated in persistent violence and misery within 
and across national boundaries. Yet the perspective offered here is entirely 
consistent with both accepted international legal principles and sound 
critical progressive traditions. It is in the best interests of humanity, in the 
sense of efficaciously dealing with misery, for progressives to work at 
incorporating a collective international duty to assist within the traditional 
humanitarian policy context. The alternative is for them to continue down 
the path of disengagement, cynicism, and despair. A failure to 
acknowledge our collective obligations and the necessity for engagement, 
which includes deploying armed forces when the occasion warrants, 
would continue to deprive American and other progressives of 
opportunities to help shape military and non-military interventions by 
powerful countries around the world.23 A reflexive aversion to the use of 
military force would not reduce or eliminate interventions or military 
adventurism by the powerful. On the contrary, the main consequence 
would be that these interventions would continue on terms dictated by less 
benign traditions and voices, without the full input of those who might be 
in the best position to mediate such engagements around the world. The 
distance between the privileged “us” and the afflicted “them” would 
continue to widen. 
 
 
HAITI (1994); SIBA N. GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS (1996); ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST (1998); RANDALL ROBINSON, AN UNBROKEN AGONY (2007). 
 21. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365 
(2004); Marti Koskenniemi, The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo and the Turn To Ethics in 
International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002). 
 22. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE (2011); THOMAS POGGE, 
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2008); THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL (2010). 
 23. See Young, supra note 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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II. HUMANITARIANISM: ACCEPTING COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THE WORLD AS IT IS 
Australian philosopher Peter Singer captured the essence of 
humanitarianism when he wrote about the humanitarian crisis in East 
Bengal (now Bangladesh) four decades ago:  
The suffering and death that are occurring there now are not 
inevitable, not unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. 
Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least 
nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not 
beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance 
to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions.24 
Time, technological advances, and economic and cultural globalization 
have not reduced the need or occasions for “decisions and actions of 
human beings” to “prevent this kind of suffering.”25 Just since 2011, the 
world community has had to acknowledge the following instances of 
human perversity: hundreds of thousands of Somalis dying or at the risk of 
dying as drought, civil war, and anarchy induced a famine26 that rolled 
over their dysfunctional land;27 thousands of Syrians dying in an 
escalating struggle between armed rebels and a brutal dynastic regime;28 
government and rebel forces in Libya locked in a war of attrition with tens 
 
 
 24. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 229 (1972). For 
more information on this crisis, see BANGLADESH GENOCIDE ARCHIVE, http://www.genocide 
bangladesh.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 25. Singer, supra note 24, at 229. 
 26. Sudarsan Raghavan, U.N.: Famine in Somalia is Killing Tens of Thousands, WASH. POST, 
July 20, 2011, at A1; Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalis Waste Away as Insurgents Block Escape From 
Famine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, at A1; UK: 400k Somali Children to Die Without More Aid, 
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44171618/ns/world_news-africa/t/uk-k-
somali-children-die-without-more-aid. 
 27. The term “country” can be only loosely applied to Somalia. Since the 1990s, the country has 
been rife with civil wars and an utter lack of central government. Benjamin Powell, Somali “Anarchy” 
Is More Orderly than Somali Government, IND. INST. (Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.independent 
.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1880. The CIA still lists Somalia as “in the process of building a 
federated parliamentary republic.” Cent. Intelligence Agency, Africa: Somalia, WORLD FACTBOOK 
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. 
 28. Liz Slye & Mary Beth Sheridan, Tanks Converge on Besieged Syrian Opposition Stronghold, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-02/world/35269206_1_ 
syrian-activists-syrian-opposition-stronghold-al-assad; Nada Bakri, Syria’s Isolation Deepens As 
Minister is Removed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at A10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of thousands of people displaced;29 and a global financial crisis that 
effortlessly crisscrossed national borders, leaving economic devastation in 
its wake.30 These were just the headlines of particular moments, and, as 
such, obscure far more than they reveal. The troubles of Haitians years 
after a devastating earthquake and the decades-long horrors of Eastern 
Congo, Darfur, North Korea, and Burma (Myanmar), to name a few, have 
also had their moments31 and remain ready to be served up again as 
periodic reminders of the far reaches and great depths of tragedies that 
continue to define human existence. Some say it is a kind of compassion 
fatigue that quickly pushes these ongoing catastrophes from the front 
pages of our minds.32 
Hour by hour, our modern world provides us with abundant reminders 
of the precariousness of our lives, the interconnectedness and banality of 
human suffering, whether occasioned by nature or by direct human device, 
and the importance of luck (or is it fate?). Technological advances have 
ensured the proliferation of communication devices so that horrors from 
distant locales more readily penetrate our hourly local newsbreaks. What  
can we do in the face of such suffering? What must we do? Why have our 
willingness and our capacity to intervene remained so far behind our 
abilities to behold? Various perspectives may be offered to justify 
different levels of international engagement, or lack thereof, in dealing 
with these large-scale human tragedies. The now largely forgotten debates 
around governmental responses to Hurricane Katrina show that these 
 
 
 29. William Booth, In War-Torn Libya, No Pause for Ramadan, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-01/world/35270872_1_rebel-stronghold-misurata-rebel-
fighters.  
 30. Koh Gui Qing & John Chalmers, Market Rout Deepens Global Economic Crisis, REUTERS, 
Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/09/us-crisis-idUSL6E7J707B2011 
0809; Paul Wiseman, Plunge on Wall Street Threatens to Spook Consumers, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 
2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/markets/2011-08-09-markets-consumer-spending_n.htm. 
 31. See, e.g., Myanmar Invites Armed Ethnic Groups to Peace Talks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9803602; Alex de Waal, The Wars of Sudan, 
NATION (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.thenation.com/article/wars-sudan; Crisis in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,  INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, www.responsibility 
toprotect.org/index.php/crisis/crisis-in-drc (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Tom Miles, North Korea Slams 
U.N. “Plot” to Investigate its Human Rights Record, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2013, available at http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/11/us-korea-north-inquiry-idUSBRE92A0TW20130311; Editorial, 
In Burma, a Blow to Democracy and Human Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2013, at Opinions, available 
at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-03/opinions/38243901_1_human-rights-watch-burmese 
-govern ment-buddhist.  
 32. See, e.g., Dart Ctr. for Journalism & Trauma, Traumatic Stress and the News Audience, Self-
Study Unit 3: Photography & Trauma, DARTCENTER.ORG, http://dartcenter.org/content/self-study-
unit-3-photography-trauma-3 (last visited May 21, 2012); COMPASSION FATIGUE AWARENESS 
PROJECT, http://www.compassionfatigue.org (last visited May 22, 2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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issues may also be found in the American domestic arena.33 In the 
international realm, the perspectives range from those that say “leave well 
enough alone, that it is none of our business,” to those that call for 
comprehensive totalizing responses justifying the supplanting of national 
regimes.34  
At the base of the problem is the resilience of abject poverty.35 The fact 
is that today’s world is one of enormous social and economic deprivation 
that often exists in close proximity with enormous wealth and 
opportunity.36 Inequality within nations and between nations continues to 
grow. Clearly, much of the wealth gains of this era have not trickled down. 
About forty percent of humanity easily qualifies today under the definition 
 
 
 33. Anna Shoup, FEMA Faces Intense Scrutiny, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www 
.pbs.org/newshour/updates/government_programs/july-dec05/fema_09-09.html. 
 34. Compare the perspectives offered by Tom Engelhardt, Washington’s Militarized Mindset: 
The Lessons Washington Can’t Draw From the Failure of the Military Operation, COMMON DREAMS, 
(July 5, 2012), https://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/07/05-5, and Christopher Preble, Recognizing 
Disaster: Please Mr. President, Don’t Intervene in Syria, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www 
.newrepublic.com/blog/plank/111052/recognizing-disaster-please-mr-president-don’t-intervene-in-syria, 
to Ruth Gordon, Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 43 
(1996). Gordon concludes:  
Perhaps international society simply has not reached the stage where its members care more 
about the lives of others than the lives of its own. If the situation is to improve, the 
international community must develop a set of criteria to discern and remedy human rights 
abuses independently of the interests of powerful nations. It must also develop the means and 
will to intervene in all of the situations that fall within these criteria . . . . 
Id. at 56. 
 35. See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Sees Progress Against Extreme Poverty, but 
Flags Vulnerabilities (Feb. 29, 2012) (Press Release no. 2012/297/DEC, available at http://go.world 
bank.org/CNQZ3RXMQ0) (“Indeed, there was only a modest drop in the number of people living 
below $2 per day between 1981 and 2008, from 2.59 billion to 2.47 billion, though falling more 
sharply since 1999.”); U.N. Dev. Programme, The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human 
Development, in 2010 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 8 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Human 
Development Report] (“About 1.75 billion people in the 104 countries covered by the MPI—a third of 
their population—live in multidimensional poverty—that is, with at least 30 percent of the indicators 
reflecting acute deprivation in health, education and standard of living. This exceeds the estimated 
1.44 billion people in those countries who live on $1.25 a day or less (though it is below the share who 
live on $2 or less).”). 
 36. Hope Yen, Income Gap Widens: Census Finds Record Gap Between Rich and Poor, 
HUFFINGTON POST BUSINESS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/28/income-
gap-widens-census-_n_741386.html (“The top-earning 20 percent of Americans—those making more 
than $100,000 each year—received 49.4 percent of all income generated in the U.S., compared with 
the 3.4 percent made by the bottom 20 percent of earners . . . .”); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS, HOUSEHOLD INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN U.S. COUNTIES: 
2006–2010 1 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbr10-18.pdf (“Since 
1967, U.S. household income inequality has grown 18 percent.“); 2010 Human Development Report, 
supra note 35, at 87–94, 116. “Inequality in a range of dimensions and across groups—including 
women and men and poor and affluent—is a growing challenge to progress in human development.” 
Id. at 116. 
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of poverty, either of the abject sort or the more acceptable, benign 
variety.37 The plight of the less fortunate has long concerned the global 
community, and leaders and experts at all levels have assuredly devoted 
countless hours of meetings, conferences, retreats, initiatives, and the like 
to helping the poor and destitute.38 Yet global poverty and gross inequality 
remain resolute.39  
It is also a fact that misery and gross inequality are policed by 
violence.40 Wars, both civil and international, have changed those in 
power, but the hard reality of misery for a huge mass of humanity has not 
been ameliorated.41 The motivations behind armed conflicts have not 
changed much over time. Control of precious natural resources and the 
power to develop and exploit labor and markets are intimate aspects of the 
exploitative impulses that succeed only with violence and the misery that 
results.42 Ideological faith offers salvation, but only for some true 
believers. Neither Communism nor its demise has changed the trajectory 
of poverty and inequality or the arc of violence.43 The triumph of neo-
liberalism and the acceptance of free-trade-anchored globalization have 
rearranged participants and brought some new leaders to the top without 
 
 
 37. 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35, at 96 (“2.6 billion people [are] estimated 
to be living on less than $2 a day.”). 
 38. According to the Secretary-General:  
During the past decade, the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals 
have led to unprecedented commitments and partnerships reaffirmed in successive summits 
and meetings, including the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development at 
Monterrey, Mexico, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, in Johannesburg, 
South Africa, and the 2005 World Summit in New York. 
U.N. Secretary-General, Keeping the Promise: a Forward-Looking Review to Promote an Agreed 
Action Agenda to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/64/665 (Feb. 
12, 2010). This statement comes from a report issued as a follow-up to another summit held in 2010. 
 39. See 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35; World Bank, supra note 35; U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 36; Michael A. Fletcher, Nearly One in Six in Poverty in the U.S.; 
Children Hit Hard, Census Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2011-09-13/business/35275047_1_poverty-rate-poverty-line-rate-for-white-children. 
 40. See PETER IADICOLA AND ANSON SHUPE, VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY, AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
315–70 (2003); Pablo Fajnzylber et al., Inequality and Violent Crime, 45 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2002). 
 41. Gassama, supra note 8. 
 42. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2004); Koskenniemi, supra note 21; see also JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (Penguin 
Books 2007) (1902); PAKENHAM, supra note 20. 
 43. One source puts the number of major wars since 1945 at about 250 with over 50 million 
people killed as a result. See War and Peace: What’s it all About?, PEACE PLEDGE UNION, http://www 
.ppu.org.uk/learn/infodocs/st_war_peace.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). See also The World At War, 
GLOBAL SECURITY, www.GlobalSecurity.org/military/world/war/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
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fundamentally affecting the relationship between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots.”44 
Grand gestures that are cast as agendas, summits, movements, 
declarations, or initiatives, designed to provide a comprehensive global 
response, have proven equally unavailing.45 For example, the current 
mega global agenda to tackle poverty, the Millennium Development 
Goals, ushered in with considerable fanfare in 2000, now approach their 
target date of 2015 with little to celebrate except the resilience of happy 
talk.46 The fears and divisions of the past remain as powerful roadblocks 
to substantive achievements. 
Neither humanitarianism in general nor humanitarian intervention 
(including its current formulation under the responsibility to protect 
doctrine) in particular has provided a solution to these intractable 
problems.47 In fact, having to talk more about humanitarianism is evidence 
of a collective failure. Such talk highlights the tragic gap between frequent 
 
 
 44. See Josh Bivens, Globalization, American Wages, and Inequality (Econ. Policy Inst., 
Working Paper No. 279, 2007); Paul Krugman, Trade and Wages, Reconsidered, BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 103, 134 (Spring 2008) (“The starting point of this paper was the observation that 
the consensus that trade has only modest effects on inequality rests on relatively old data—that there 
has been a dramatic increase in manufactured imports . . . . And it is probably true that this increase 
has been a force for greater inequality in the United States and other developed countries.”).  
 Even free-trade advocates have noticed this. The Libertarian pro-free trade policy group, the Cato 
Institute, has criticized the International Monetary Fund, the leading international organization 
promoting neo-liberal trade policies:  
If the goal is to help developing countries progress economically and to promote a liberal 
global economy, then, at the very least, rich countries should deny further funding for the 
IMF . . . . The IMF does not appear to have helped countries either to achieve self-sustaining 
growth or to implement market reforms. 
CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 107TH 
CONGRESS 651–52 (2001). See also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002). 
 45. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 
2005); THE WORLD BANK & THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, 2005 REVIEW OF THE POVERTY 
REDUCTION STRATEGY APPROACH (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/ 
Resources/PRSP-Review/2005_Review_Final.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 38. 
 46. Press Release, World Bank & Int’l Monetary Fund, Developing World Lags on Global 
Targets Related to Food and Nutrition, Says IMF-World Bank Report  (Apr. 20, 2012, Press Release 
No. 2012/397/DEC). 
 47. As one author describes the issue:  
Not only does this representation of the emergencies not allow disclosure on the causes of the 
disparities between spectator and victim, but it also increases the distance between “us” and 
“them”. Focusing the attention only to the immediacy of short-term efforts the fundraising 
campaigns impede longer-term attention to social change, inequality, and reconstruction. 
Pierluigi Musarò, Living in Emergency: Humanitarian Images and the Inequality of Lives, 2 NEW 
CULTURAL FRONTIERS 13, 37–38 (2011). See also Andrew Anthony, Does Humanitarian Aid Prolong 
Wars?, OBSERVER (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/apr/25/humanitarian-aid-
war-linda-polman. 
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affirmations of common humanity and the harsh realities of life in the 
world we have created and sustained. Clearly lasting solutions cannot be 
found in the pleas to give more aid or to deploy military force to help our 
fellow humans in crisis. The persistent or recurrent nature of these 
demands burdens our vision and our body, and may soon wither our 
collective capacity for compassion, charity, and sacrifice. Indeed in the 
world that we have created and nurtured, who can credibly talk of 
solutions? Hasn’t the world had enough already of the solutions movement 
and its assorted salespeople? Some measure of humility should propel us 
toward doing what we can when we can, avoiding grand pronouncements 
and totalizing theories.  
The argument for the collective right and duty to save lives at risk 
under extreme circumstances is in no sense a claim about resolving 
longstanding and seemingly intractable problems. It actually sets a very 
low pragmatic bar of expectations for humanity. A duty to assist imposed 
on the international community, as a true collective, also does not promote 
use of force as a central feature. The option to use force would exist as an 
important component of our larger duties to each other, even if only as a 
last gasp response of humanity when the extremes of misery and violence 
begin to overwhelm us. However, as the Article emphasizes, no iteration 
of the norm of humanitarian intervention could ever attain the legitimacy it 
desires unless it is enhanced by a broader and deeper norm of duty or 
obligation to assist those in desperate need across sovereign boundaries. 
This broader obligation, to make a substantial difference, would be 
triggered long before the cameras arrive or the calls for the deployment of 
troops go out.48  
III. FROM HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 
A. Humanitarian Intervention Defined 
Humanitarian intervention has been defined as the “use of physical 
force within the sovereign territory of another state by other states or the 
United Nations for the purpose of either the protection of, or the provision 
 
 
 48. The objections to this enhanced notion of responsibility incorporating an explicit duty to aid 
have been registered by the United States among others. See Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power 
Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of 
International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 501 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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of emergency aid to, the population within the territory.”49 It is the use of 
force by one state or a combination of states to exercise authority within 
the jurisdiction of another state, without that state’s permission, in order to 
protect innocent people from widespread and shocking levels of violence 
or other massive tragedies perpetrated or permitted by the government of 
the target state.50 Historically, moral arguments were employed to justify 
resorting to what is in effect war, the ultimate anti-human condition, by 
claiming superior humanitarian ends.51 The end of World War II saw a 
decided effort to strengthen law as it pertains to the declaration and 
conduct of war in general. The post-war trials of defeated political and 
military leaders and the development of international security and human 
rights institutions and standards have buttressed this process. Since that 
period, humanitarian intervention has been contested on both moral and 
legal grounds.52  
Legal justification for intervention under humanitarian principles has 
found support mainly in interpretations of the U.N. Charter (the “Charter”) 
provisions governing the legal use of force53 in the context of U.N. 
Security Council practices.54 U.N. Security Council practices are derived 
 
 
 49. Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
4, 18 (1992). 
 50. This elaboration is consistent with other definitions. See Terry Nardin, Introduction, in 47 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 51. See Terry Nardin, The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 57 
(2002); Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying 
Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 95 (1992), available at http://repository.forced 
migration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:2654 (“Four decades have been spent defining human rights, and they are 
now clearer as a justification for action than ever before.”). See generally Joseph Boyle, Traditional 
Just War Theory and Humanitarian Intervention, in 47 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS, 
supra note 3, at 31; SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 7–14.  
 52. See Richard A. Falk, Humanitarian Intervention: Imperatives and Problematics, in WESTON, 
FALK, CHARLESWORTH, AND STRAUSS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, A PROBLEM 
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 315–23 (4th ed. 2006); Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian 
Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 323 (1996). 
 53. Specifically, see U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3–4 (“All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not 
endangered” and “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). See also id. art. 34 (“The Security Council 
may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security”); id. art. 39 (“The Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
 54. See Thomas Franck, Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention, in 47 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS, supra note 3, at 143. 
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from the United Nations’ two core purposes: to prevent war and to defend 
human dignity.55 The Charter identifies these two aims as intimately 
connected and not in opposition to each other. The reason we want peace 
and security is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . .”56 
As such, the Charter places a premium on the preservation of international 
peace and security, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and 
the removal of threats to international peace and security. In keeping with 
these aims, modern international law, or post-Charter international law, 
has narrowed the right of states to use force in international relations as 
well as in domestic situations. The legal right of state authorities to use 
force is limited in all circumstances.57 The key factor is the impact such 
resort to force has on the core values behind the founding of the United 
Nations. While the threat to international peace and security is more 
readily seen where force is employed in international disputes, there was a 
clear understanding since the inception of the United Nations that even 
domestic disputes may also fester and expand into international disputes.  
Generally, a country may resort to war only in self-defense (including 
the defense of others) or with prior approval of the United Nations 
Security Council.58 The legal domination of this arena by the Security 
Council is complete, since in all cases the legal right of a state to use force 
ceases when the Security Council demands it.59 The recent actions of the 
Security Council against the Gaddafi regime in Libya affirmed Security 
Council hegemony over the use of force by a state even in the domestic 
sphere.60 The intense deliberations within the Security Council over 
 
 
 55. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . .”); id. art. 1, para. 1 (“To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the international peace, and for the suppression of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace . . . .”). 
 56. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 57. Id. arts. 33–34, 37, 44–50. 
 58. See id. art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing Member State 
action and creating a no-fly zone in Libya); S.C. Res. 2009, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011) 
(establishing a U.N. ground force in Libya); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/5
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international legal authorization of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
were another critical episode in the development of this legal hegemony.61  
Other Charter provisions support the dominant role of the Security 
Council in this arena.62 These provisions allow the Security Council wide 
latitude to become involved in disputes affecting one or more states. 
Article 34 of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to investigate any 
“dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give 
rise to a dispute . . . .”63 Thus when the governments of Tunisia and 
Turkey recently complained about the onslaught of refugees fleeing into 
their territories to escape escalating and widespread violence in Libya and 
Syria respectively, the Security Council was authorized to investigate.64 
Article 39 of the Charter further empowers the Security Council to 
determine whether situations or disputes amount to “the existence of any 
threat to the peace . . . .”65 Articles 40 through 50 of the Charter capture 
the broad range of legal options available to the Security Council to act in 
furtherance of its mandate under the Charter.66 Certainly the practices of 
the Security Council in response to breaches of international peace and 
security have been influenced as much by political reality as by legality.67 
But this would be true of any action taken by politically constituted 
bodies. 
Operationally, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was of little 
consequence during the Cold War period.68 The many interventions of that 
era did not even bother to seriously engage the doctrine.69 More explicitly 
 
 
on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, U.N. Doc. S/2011/727 (Nov. 22, 2011) (discussing 
the effects of these actions). 
 61. See generally UCHENNA EMEAGWALI & JEANNIE GONZALEZ, LAWYERS’ COMM. ON 
NUCLEAR POLICY, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS REGARDING IRAQ (July 2003), available 
at lcnp.org/global/reportSCIraq.pdf. 
 62. See U.N. Charter arts. 24–25. 
 63. Id. art. 34 (emphasis added). 
 64. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6490th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6490 (Feb. 25, 2011); U.N. 
SCOR, 67th Sess., 6710th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6710 (Jan. 31, 2012). 
 65. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 66. For example, “These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and 
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.” Id. art. 41. 
 67. See Falk, supra note 52; Thomas Frank, Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian 
Intervention, in 47 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS 143, supra note 3. 
 68. Karen Engle, “Calling in The Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, 
Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 205–06 (2007). 
 69. SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 9–11. “The debates remained largely theoretical through the 1970s 
and 1980s, as no government seriously sought to justify military interventions on humanitarian 
grounds, even though the interveners used the term gratuitously on many occasions.” Id. at 10. See 
also Engle, supra note 68, at 206 (“In many instances, states would claim to be protecting their own 
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political justifications, such as national interest, accompanied the many 
instances in which the West or the East acted to consolidate or expand 
their spheres of influence.70 These were especially destructive 
interventions, particularly for those in the developing world.71 Non-
alignment proved as valuable to these people as it did to the inhabitants of 
Melos generations ago at the time of the Peloponnesian War.72 Yet Cold 
War politics had one effect: responsibility for order around the world was 
at least roughly demarcated by might.73 
The immediate post-Cold War period saw an explosion of 
humanitarian crises that challenged positive expectations of the time.74 
Without Cold War-era incentives to contain violence and disorder, 
powerful nations showed little enthusiasm for accepting the 
responsibilities and consequences of large-scale intervention. In the 
extreme cases like Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda, the world looked to 
a United Nations that proved to be woefully unprepared.75 
Eventually, in a few select cases, the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention made appearances, generally muddled, incoherent, and 
ineffectual.76 As some scholars, policy-makers, and activists worked to 
explain, refine, and institutionalize the doctrine, others began to question 
its rationales, efficacy, and possible consequences.77 Of greatest concern 
 
 
citizens in other countries or guarding their borders from refugee flows (both forms of self-defense) 
. . . .”). 
 70. See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 120–77 (1990); IVAN 
MUSICANT, THE BANANA WARS: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN 
AMERICA FROM THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR TO THE INVASION OF PANAMA (1990), GREG 
GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW 
IMPERIALISM (2007); Alex de Waal, Military Intervention in Africa: Intervention Unbound, THE 
HORNET, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA-AFRICA STUDIES CENTER (Feb. 8, 1995), http://www.africa. 
upenn.edu/Hornet/milt_intv.html.  
 71. See supra note 69.  
 72. See generally THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (1972). 
 73. See Michael Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in 
Contemporary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 171 (1988). 
 74. At least one author has proposed that this rash of crises came as a result of the changes of the 
post-Cold War era. Martha Finnemore, Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention, in MORAL LIMIT 
AND POSSIBILITY IN WORLD POLITICS 197, 199–205 (Richard M. Price ed., 2008). 
 75. See, e.g., Tobias Debiel et al., Norm-building Through the Practice of Interventionism: How 
the U.N. Security Council Contributed to the Emergence of the R2P, 5 J. INTERVENTION & 
STATEBUILDING (SPECIAL ISSUE) 72, 92–99 (2011); L.J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
RWANDA TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24–30 (2005); Ibrahim J. 
Gassama, World Order in the Post Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Nations After 
Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INTL’L L. 255 (1994). 
 76. Debiel, supra note 75, at 99–105. 
 77. Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the 
Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 998 (2009). See generally 47 HUMANITARIAN 
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to those opposed to such interventions were its implications for 
sovereignty and self-determination of peoples.78 The fear of cloaking 
another round of imperial interventions in incoherent and indeterminate 
post-World War II legal doctrines was high and widespread.79 Of 
significant concern was also the appropriateness of linking 
humanitarianism to war, both as a matter of principle as well as an 
effective means of resolving human tragedies.80 A different set of 
objections was raised by those wedded to the continuation of power 
politics. They were troubled by institutionalized restraints on powerful 
nations and wanted such nations to have the freedom to define their self-
interests and to act unilaterally.81 
What seemed to be an escalation of crises in the immediate post-Cold 
War period, the well-publicized ineffectiveness of the international 
community in dealing with them, and doctrinal and operational resistance 
to the humanitarian intervention doctrine combined to spur a rethinking of 
how the international community could assist in large-scale humanitarian 
crises where national governmental structures have failed. This is the 
origin of the Responsibility to Protect Project.82 
B. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
The Responsibility to Protect Project sought to improve both 
international responses and the perception of such responses in the wake 
of massive humanitarian crises of the immediate post-Cold War era.83 
 
 
INTERVENTION: NOMOS, supra note 3. 
 78. See, e.g., Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the 
United Nations, 36 HARV INT’L L.J. 341, 356 (“[T]he U.N. endorsed all necessary force in a setting in 
which the only threat to international peace and security arose from the outflow of refugees. Such 
endorsement raises serious questions about the promise in the Charter to avoid encroachments on 
‘domestic jurisdiction.’”); Orford, supra note 77, at 1003. 
 79. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING 
WORLD ORDER 293–94 (1996). 
 80. SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 17–18 (“Advocates of the non-political nature of humanitarian aid 
dislike the idea of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Not only is it an oxymoron—since 
military intervention is inherently political—but military intervention also causes humanitarian aid to 
become politicized. . . . Military intervention can also increase the intensity of the violence. . . .”). 
 81. Ned Dobos, Justifying Humanitarian Intervention to the People Who Pay for It, 1 PRAXIS 34 
(2008). For example, “Neo-conservative political realist Charles Krauthammer proposes that if and 
only if humanitarian intervention is ‘strategically necessary’ does the intervening government act 
within the limits of the authority vested in it by its people.” Id. at 44. See generally JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); NYE, JR., supra note 6. 
 82. See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to 
General Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 GA/9596). 
 83. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
712 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:695 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, the United Nations came under intense criticism for its failed 
responses to tragedies in the Balkans and Africa in the early 1990s.84 U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had been responsible for U.N. 
Peacekeeping operations during the Rwanda genocide, urged the 
development of “a new global consensus on intervention for human 
protection.”85 He encouraged an examination of international 
responsibility to protect vulnerable populations while “maintaining and 
even strengthening the sovereignty of states.”86  
The government of Canada took the lead and helped to sponsor the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
a transnational non-governmental body composed of individuals who had 
achieved prominence in international affairs.87 The commission’s mandate 
was to “promote a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster 
global political consensus” that would lead to action within the U.N. 
system.88 Specifically, the commission was expected to “find new ways of 
reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable notions of intervention and state 
sovereignty.”89 
The most important contribution of the Responsibility to Protect 
Project was its reformulation of the discourse from “the right to intervene” 
to “the responsibility to protect.”90 The new language of responsibility was 
adopted primarily to avoid the historical baggage of the term 
“intervention” and to respond to humanitarian activists who wanted to 
rescue the term “humanitarian intervention” from its association with the 
use of force. However, the commission did acknowledge that changing 
terminology did not resolve the substantive questions surrounding the 
 
 
PROTECT ¶¶ 1.1–1.4, 8.6 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://www.responsibilityto 
protect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
 84. See SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 61–78; see also Gassama, supra note 75.  
 85. See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Addresses International Peace 
Academy Seminar on ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Feb. 15, 2002, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/ 
8125). 
 86. Id. 
 87. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at 77–81. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced 
the formation of the commission at the U.N. Millennium Assembly in September, 2000, as a response 
to the Secretary-General’s appeal. Two highly regarded diplomats, Gareth Evans, President of the 
International Crisis Group and former Australian Foreign Minister, and Algerian diplomat Mohamed 
Sahnoun, were appointed as co-chairs. The other members of the commission were: Gisèle Côté-
Harper, Lee Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel 
Ramos, Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein, and Ramesh Thakur. Id. at 81, Appendix A.  
 88. Id. at 81. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
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protection of the vulnerable when national authorities are unwilling or 
incapable of doing so.91  
At the core of this emerging norm of responsibility to protect is the 
axiom “that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe,” and the assertion “that when they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the 
broader community of states.”92 The commission articulated an 
understanding of state sovereignty that was predicated on the state’s 
responsibility to protect its people. The responsibility to protect was thus 
defined to incorporate both national and international dimensions. The 
international dimension was subordinated to the state dimension, but only 
when the affected state was carrying out its responsibilities.93 The right of 
the international community, acting through the United Nations, to 
intervene where and when there has been state failure was made explicit.94 
The primacy of the U.N. Security Council in the process was also 
confirmed where and when there has been a failure of protection at the 
state level.95 However, the commission’s work fell short of clearly 
articulating a prescriptive norm of responsibility to protect.96 It failed to 
support or defend a legal obligation on the part of the international 
community to intervene where its right to do so is clear. The commission 
opened up a path toward such an obligation, but in the end settled for a 
largely moral and political exhortation.97 
 
 
 91. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 92. Garth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, Foreword to ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at viii. 
 93. ICISS REPORT, supra, note 83, ¶¶ 2.15, 2.30–2.31. 
 94. Id. ¶ 2.31, 4.1, 4.7–4.9. 
 95. Id. at xii–xiii, ¶¶ 6.12–6.24, 6.36–6.40. 
 96. Instead, the report classified the responsibility as a “continuum.” Id. ¶ 7.50. See also Alex J. 
Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143, 169; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and 
UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 121, 136 (2005) (“Given the 
failure to locate the responsibility to protect in any U.N. structures apart from the Security Council, the 
difficulties inherent in Security Council reform could come to hinder normative progress around the 
responsibility to protect.”); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in 
International Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1232 (2011). 
 97. E.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶ 8.12 (“[P]leas for international action of the kind we 
are dealing with in this report need to be supported by arguments having four different kinds of appeal: 
moral, financial, national interest and partisan.”); accord Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect 
and September 11, Address at the UNU/Canadian Government Seminar on The Responsibility to 
Protect (Dec. 16, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/ 
speeches/2002/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-september-11.aspx) (“We did not argue in our report 
that there is now a sufficiently strong basis in principle and practice to claim the existence of a formal 
new principle of customary international law. But we did argue that the ‘responsibility to protect’ is an 
emerging international norm, or guiding principle . . . .”). 
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 The commission implored the U.N. Security Council to “deal promptly 
with any request for authority to intervene . . .” and asked the five 
permanent members of the Security Council to “agree not to apply their 
veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved to 
obstruct the passage of resolution authorizing military intervention for 
human protection purposes. . . .”98 The commission had no realistic 
proposal for dealing with situations where the Security Council fails to act 
in the face of an international tragedy.99 It plaintively reminded the 
Security Council that its failure could lead to unilateral action and hurt the 
stature and credibility of the United Nations.100 Lessons from the recent 
past suggest that such considerations have not proven effective in getting 
the Security Council to act.101 
In spite of its considerable baggage, the Responsibility to Protect 
Project is the most comprehensive effort to date by the international legal 
and political establishment to refine acceptable legal rationales for 
humanitarian intervention.102 While the responsibility to protect doctrine 
has not fully resolved the many legal and political issues surrounding the 
use of force for humanitarian reasons, it has been received in official 
quarters as an important step in that direction because of its recasting of 
old debates over humanitarian intervention.103  
 
 
 98. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at xii–xiii. 
 99. The report merely warns of the dangers of inaction. See id. ¶¶ 6.36–6.40. 
 100. Id. at xiii. 
 101. See Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution 
on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan 
(Feb. 4, 2012, U.N. Press Release SC/10536); Bellamy, supra note 96, at 168. 
 102. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶ 1.6 (“In an address to the 54th session of the UN 
General Assembly in September 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected upon ‘the prospects for 
human security and intervention in the next century.’ He recalled the failures of the Security Council 
to act in Rwanda and Kosovo, and challenged the member states of the UN to ‘find common ground in 
upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.’ The 
Secretary-General warned that ‘If the collective conscience of humanity . . . cannot find in the United 
Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for 
justice.’ In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly a year later, he restated the dilemma, and 
repeated the challenge: . . . ‘if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’”). 
 103. The project members deliberately avoided the use of the term “humanitarian intervention” 
primarily because of its historical baggage. See id. ¶ 2.2. However, their focus was in no sense 
substantively different from the matters addressed by the older doctrine. Their notion of responsibility 
also differs from traditional understanding of the term since it lacks consequences for a failure to act 
on the part of those supposedly responsible. 
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IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: CRITICAL LEGAL AND POLICY 
CONCERNS 
This section briefly discusses longstanding issues surrounding the 
legality, as well as the politics, of employing force to provide aid to others 
outside the jurisdiction of the providers, whether cast as collective 
humanitarian intervention or in the guise of the newly minted 
responsibility to protect. Objections to humanitarian intervention, even 
when cast in legal terms, have actually revolved more around moral or 
broader political considerations than strictly legal ones.104 The next 
section argues that the responsibility to protect doctrine, absent a broader 
obligation to assist under international law, is unlikely to meet the 
objections of progressive communities in the United States and elsewhere 
to the use of force in international affairs by the more powerful members 
of the international community.105 As such, it is crucial to develop a 
doctrine of an ongoing legal obligation in international affairs to assist 
without regard to traditional sovereignty-based barriers or narrow 
humanitarian predicates as a supplement to the emerging norm of the 
responsibility to protect.106  
Many of the difficulties progressives have with humanitarian 
intervention mirror their broader objections to the use of armed force in 
international affairs. For them, longstanding efforts to restrict the use of 
military force in international affairs would be undermined if the 
humanitarian intervention exception were allowed to flourish.107 Thus the 
change in formulation from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to 
protect has not assuaged their concerns.108 The issue here is not whether 
those in need should receive international assistance, but whether 
assistance delivered through the use of external military force is ever a 
necessary, effective, or otherwise acceptable vehicle by which such 
assistance is to be conveyed.  
 
 
 104. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 78, passim. See generally 47 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
NOMOS, supra note 3. 
 105. For a discussion of some of these objections, see Jonah Eaton, Note, An Emerging Norm? 
Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765 
(2011). See also Falk, supra note 78. 
 106. See Payandeh, supra note 48. 
 107. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (concerning the principle of restricting military force) codified 
these efforts. 
 108. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 96, at 1235; see, e.g., Alex De Waal, Darfur and the Failure of 
the Responsibility to Protect, 83 INT’L AFF. 1039 (2007). 
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A. Humanitarian Intervention and R2P: The Legal Issues 
Many of the arguments against humanitarian intervention should be 
properly classified as political objections, as opposed to strictly legal ones, 
if one accepts that law reflects little more than settled politics. Those who 
attempted to renovate the traditional discourse of humanitarian 
intervention in terms of an emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect 
recognized that the problem was primarily one of obtaining political 
legitimacy.109 Yet by focusing on the language and processes of legality, 
the Responsibility to Protect Project replicated an old and traditionally 
effective means of gaining political legitimacy through the language of 
law. The rest of this section will examine the limits of the debate over 
humanitarian intervention when cast in narrow legal or doctrinal terms. 
Modern international law of the post-World War II era limited the right 
of nations to use force in international relations and brought the issue of 
forcible intervention against a sovereign power into the realm of law.110 
However, Cold War politics ensured no consensus on the matter for 
several decades. Major tragedies of the immediate post-Cold War era in 
the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda forced the international community to 
deal with both the legal right and political ability to intervene across 
borders of sovereignty in order to aid people in distress and save lives.111 
A traditional legalist interpretation of the issues would conclude that 
there is general consensus today on the narrow legal question of whether 
the right exists under international law to engage in humanitarian 
intervention.112 This consensus predated the emergence of the 
 
 
 109. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at viii: 
 But the text on which we have found consensus does reflect the shared views of all 
Commissioners as to what is politically achievable in the world as we know it today. We want 
no more Rwandas, and we believe that the adoption of the proposals in our report is the best 
way of ensuring that. We share a belief that it is critical to move the international consensus 
forward, and we know that we cannot begin to achieve that if we cannot find consensus 
among ourselves. We simply hope that what we have achieved can now be mirrored in the 
wider international community. 
 110. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 24–26, 33, 39, 51. 
 111. See Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 323 
passim (1996); MURPHY, supra note 79, at 145–46. 
 112. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (2d ed. 2005); Eaton, supra note 105, at 800. 
See generally Anna Bergh, The Legal Status of Humanitarian Intervention (2008) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, Lund University) (available at http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1319977/ 
file/1319978.pdf); DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL ASPECTS (1999). Debate in this area is around unilateral intervention without prior 
authorization by the U.N. See Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of 
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 276 (1973); Payandeh, supra 
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responsibility to protect doctrine. Humanitarian interventions are 
presumed legal when done under the authority of the United Nations 
Security Council and in support of human rights.113 This is especially the 
case when intervention is done collectively, even if through regional 
multinational entities or ad hoc coalitions of states. Years before the 
Responsibility to Protect Project affirmed it, Fernando Teson stated, “the 
international community now has accepted a norm that allows collective 
humanitarian intervention to respond to serious human rights abuses.”114 
However, there is still considerable disquiet over unilateral interventions 
even when sanctioned by the United Nations.115 It is important to 
acknowledge that this interpretation does not address critical questions 
about indeterminacy, coherence, and the substantive vision of international 
legal doctrines, nor the structure of international law and legal regimes in 
general. For the purpose of this Article, these questions are best considered 
under the policy objections to the doctrine set out below.  
The liberal legalist consensus supporting the right to engage in 
collective humanitarian intervention minimized sovereignty-based 
objections rooted in an earlier conception of international law. This is not 
to suggest that Pre-World War II international law was a great respecter of 
national sovereignty. No conception of international law has worked to 
protect weaker nations from the designs of the more powerful.116 In 
general, international law has accorded the concept of sovereign equality 
only enough weight as would allow it to be employed as a flexible shield 
and sword by nation-states in their interactions with each other.117 Modern 
international law, culminating in the U.N. Charter, retained a place for the 
concept in the procedural organization of inter-state affairs.118 But it 
 
 
note 48, at 505–09; Sarah Mazzochi, Humanitarian Intervention in a Post-Iraq, Post-Darfur World, 17 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 123–28 (2011). 
 113. See U.N. Charter arts. 23–54. 
 114. Teson, supra note 111, at 324; see also Orford, supra note 77, at 996 (“Humanitarian 
intervention was largely conceived of as an exceptional measure undertaken in situations of extreme 
emergency and extreme human suffering. . . . the institutional and ideological conditions of the post-
Cold War period led to the growth of support amongst policy makers and academics for the idea that 
force could legitimately be used . . . .”). 
 115. See John Nichols, Obama Tries, Without Success, to Explain an Undeclared War, NATION 
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/159526/obama-tries-without-success-explain-undeclared 
-war; ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶ 6.9 (“Collective intervention blessed by the U.N. is regarded as 
legitimate because it is duly authorized by a representative international body; unilateral intervention is 
seen as illegitimate because self-interested”). 
 116. See generally GROVOGUI, supra note 20. 
 117. See Karima Bennoune, Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Re-examining Sovereignty and Human 
Rights Through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 243 (2002). 
 118. U.N. Charter art. 2. 
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sucked it dry of critical substantive force. Thus even as modern 
international law extolled the sovereign equality of all states, large and 
small, strong and weak, it bound the international community of states 
inexorably in such a manner that the line of demarcation between the local 
and the global was thin and infinitely subject to manipulation in the 
service of intervention.119  
The doctrinal foundation that supports humanitarian intervention 
consists of the vast network of internationally binding agreements that has 
developed since the end of World War II. The U.N. Charter, the Genocide 
Convention, international human rights treaties, and the Rome Statute 
creating the International Criminal Court represent collectively the 
willingness of nations, albeit with varying motivations, to assent to some 
measure of a collective say in the way they conduct their business (at least 
under some circumstances).120  
At the apex of this ceding of traditional sovereign prerogative is the 
acceptance of the authority of the United Nations Security Council to 
decide its jurisdictional mandate, essentially limited only by its own 
politics.121 Operationally the U.N. mandate to maintain international peace 
and security, and to promote human rights,122 as well as the mandates of 
other related multinational institutions, such as national solvency, 
developing markets, and trade liberalization, have also contributed to 
erasing hard notions of sovereignty.123 
Today’s structure of globalized existence demands an extraordinary 
level of co-existence and mutual dependence. Multinational organizations 
such as the U.N., World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
 
 
 119. While U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 declares that the U.N. was “based on the sovereign equality 
of all its members,” and art. 2, para. 7 limits U.N. authority “in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state,” the Charter makes it clear that U.N. authority under Chapter VII transcends 
such limitations. See U.N. Charter arts. 24, para. 1, 39, 41, 42, 48.  
 120. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. For example, the Genocide Convention 
allows “Any Contracting Party [to] call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such 
action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated . . . .” Genocide Convention, supra 
note 11, art. VIII.  
 121. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . .”); id. art 2, para. 7 (protecting “matters which 
are essentially within domestic jurisdiction” from U.N. intervention, but exempting Security Council 
“enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”). 
 122. See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1. 
 123. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 1, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended Mar. 3, 2011; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development art. 1, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended Feb. 
16, 1989; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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Trade Organization (WTO); trade regimes such as the General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade (GATT), European Union (EU), North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and global corporations such as Apple, 
British Petroleum, General Electric, and Microsoft have connected 
virtually all national communities. These institutions and entities have 
made non-participation in the dynamic globalization processes of a new 
world order, prohibitively costly for virtually all communities and 
individuals.124 The fact that this structure is hierarchical, undemocratic, 
and grossly unjust in the eyes of many does not change this reality.125 The 
inconsistency in its operations and the negative consequences of its effects 
can hardly be disputed. Yet this structure exists with little evidence of 
sustained or effective objections from governments and institutions 
claiming to represent those who are still very much on the outside. The 
fact is that it creates law that binds effectively in its daily operations. A 
recent example: when two former colonial powers, France and the United 
Kingdom, later joined by the United States, decided to employ force 
against the Gaddafi regime in 2011, many regimes similarly situated to 
Colonel Gaddafi’s acquiesced.126 This acquiescence becomes a precedent 
for action later, perhaps in Syria or Iran. A more longstanding example in 
the economic sphere is the blatant refusal of the developed nations to 
follow free-trade rules and allow access to agricultural products from 
developing countries.127 The dire consequences faced by poor countries 
because of domestic agricultural subsidies by advanced economies that are 
in clear violation of established free-trade rules are not in dispute.128 Yet 
these violations proceed unabated even as the World Trade Organization 
retains the acquiescence of much of the world.129 These anomalies have 
 
 
 124. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 44; AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003); RICHARD 
BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS (1994); THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). 
 125. STIGLITZ, supra note 44; BARNET & CAVANAGH, supra note 124; THE CASE AGAINST THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 124. 
 126. Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone over Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at A1. 
 127. See Max Borders & H. Sterling Burnett, Farm Subsidies: Devastating the World’s Poor and 
the Environment, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 547 (Mar. 24, 2006), 
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba547.pdf; Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Chief Economist Urges Cuts 
in Rich Country Agricultural Subsidies (Nov. 19, 2002) (available at http://go.worldbank.org/OAFJF 
JF260). 
 128. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32060, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
NEGOTIATIONS: THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2011). 
 129. Recurrent controversies over the selection of leaders for the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank also show the dissatisfaction and impotence of those who are trying to adjust the 
status quo. See Ariel Buira, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance Without Legitimacy? (Centre 
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not affected the core legitimacy of these multinational institutions. Even 
their victims are invested in their continued operation.  
These institutions operate with the understanding that it would be more 
costly for them to allow disruptive crises or tragedies anywhere in the 
world to fester than for them to respect sovereign independence.130 The 
persistence of humanitarian crises, as dictated by degree of media interest, 
elevates concern in the public sphere and allows for growing doubts about 
the legitimacy, purpose, or value of these institutions. Therefore, it is not 
in their interest to be seen as too powerless in the face of much-publicized 
emergencies. For example, people who may otherwise reject the 
hegemony of the IMF or World Bank may question why they have not 
done something when economies go into a tailspin.131 Those who may be 
skeptical of the U.N. commitment to sovereign equality might put aside 
their disdain during a well-covered famine. Thus pressures to justify their 
existence and satisfy the need for intervention sometimes propel these 
institutions toward taking actions that further weaken barriers posed by 
traditional notions of sovereignty.  
Two other developments have eroded sovereignty concerns and 
enhanced prospects for humanitarian interventions. They are technological 
advancements, especially those in the communications industry, and an 
increasing recognition that the most critical problems facing humanity, 
such as environmental degradation and climate change, are resolvable only 
by collaboration across sovereign borders. These developments have 
helped to make actors of diverse ideological perspectives and interests 
more willing to weaken the barriers posed by hard notions of national 
sovereignty.132  
In the face of this mix of global structures, institutions, and entities and 
with the confluence of interests brought about by technology, desires, and 
need, opposition to the legality of humanitarian intervention is 
increasingly anachronistic. An inflexible political distaste for humanitarian 
 
 
for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper No. 
180/05, 2005); Ian Talley, Senior IMF Economist Resigns, Cites Suppression and Europe Bias, REAL 
TIME ECON., WSJ BLOGS (July 4, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/07/20/senior-
imf-economist-resigns-cites-suppression-and-europe-bias/; Annie Lowrey, College President is 
Obama’s Pick for World Bank Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at B1, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/24/business/global/dartmouth-president-is-obamas-pick-for-world-bank.html. 
 130. See supra quote accompanying note 98. 
 131. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, for instance, the IMF and World Bank were 
subjected to new and widespread criticisms. Tyler Marshall, IMF, World Bank: Dispensing Loans at a 
Price, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/09/business/fi-11497. 
 132. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 96, at 1181, 1229, 1237–38. 
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intervention finds little support in the international law and politics that 
operate today. 
B. R2P and Humanitarian Intervention: Political Objections 
The U.S. just started another war. We’re good at starting wars. 
We’re not good at ending them, but we start them really well. They 
say this is for “humanitarian” reasons. Aren’t they all? But we still 
haven’t intervened in arguably the clearest humanitarian crisis: 
Darfur. . . . Muammar Gaddafi is crazy, and brutal, and dangerous. 
But the U.S. has known many dictators like that and has supported 
them faithfully for years, as long as they are compliant with our 
interests. But when their craziness makes them no longer compliant, 
we go to war against them for the humanitarian cause of protecting 
their people. Right. Oh, and then there’s oil. . . . It’s amazing how 
consistent U.S. foreign policy is from administration to 
administration . . . .133 
Jim Wallis’ skepticism of the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya 
summarizes what may be termed the political objections of many, 
including American progressives, to humanitarian interventions.134 Three 
sets of concerns may be discerned from their objections to humanitarian 
intervention: (1) motivation/moral standing, (2) coherence and 
consistency, and (3) effectiveness and resource allocation.  
1. The Problems of Motivation and Moral Standing 
Critics of humanitarian interventions question the motivation of those 
proposing the interventions.135 This issue is closely linked to what may be 
termed the “moral standing” question. The ghosts of past interventions 
remain to haunt all interventions. Little from the past of big power 
involvement in weaker nations suggests benign motivation.136 In the case 
of the United States, abundant evidence from past interventions in Cuba, 
the Philippines, Hawaii, Haiti, Congo, and Central America, among 
others,137 point to imperial motivations camouflaged in humanitarian 
 
 
 133. Jim Wallis, The Hypocrisy of War, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (Mar. 22, 2011, 4:13 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-wallis/the-hypocrisy-of-war_b_839178.html. 
 134. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3–4. 
 135. See Wallis, supra note 133. 
 136. See MURPHY, supra note 79, at 83–116. 
 137. See, e.g., SIDNEY LENS, THE FORGING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 333–65 (2d ed. 2003). 
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justifications, followed by occupation, resistance, pacification, and all 
their attendant horrible consequences for human rights. It is further argued 
that a broader history of conquest to acquire the human and material 
resources of weaker nations, as well as the processes of globalization 
marked by a continuing desire for exclusive and inexpensive access to the 
natural resources and markets of these nations, make the humanitarian 
claims behind armed intervention generally suspect.138 To many, this 
ignoble history, combined with a desperate present, disqualifies the United 
States and the West in general from carrying the banner of humanitarian 
rights arbiter or enforcer. 
One response to these concerns is to suggest that history implicates 
everyone in injustice, and that the standards and practices of the past 
should not remain a yolk on our present-day willingness and capacity to 
act for the common good. Without endorsing a progress narrative, one 
could still argue that resistance against the old order, with its marks of 
imperialism and colonialism, has succeeded to such a degree that we may 
now be on the outskirts of a dynamic new international arrangement. This 
new regime could be capable of developing and supporting a richer, more 
textured understanding of self-determination in the context of 
globalization and its consequences. 
Also, no one should ignore the tremendous and often quite unexpected 
results of the interventions of the past—benign, malicious, or otherwise. 
For example, a Kenyan student, active in the anti-colonial struggles of his 
barely independent homeland, came to the United States just a few 
decades ago.139 He fathered a child with an American woman from the 
nation’s heartland while both were temporarily sojourning in one of the 
outposts of this infant empire. This child became the leader of this most 
powerful nation less than half a century later, less than half a century after 
American civil rights laws began to transform widespread de jure racial 
discrimination.140 Neither the child’s mother nor father lived long enough 
to see this development, but the evidence of such difficult-to-predict 
consequences should not be dismissed. The extraordinary fact that many 
Americans continue to doubt the legitimacy of President Obama’s claim to 
office by questioning the authenticity of his birth certificate, even as he 
 
 
 138. See generally PAKENHAM, supra note 20; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9; CONRAD, supra note 
42. See also GROVOGUI,  supra note 20.  
 139. See BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER (1995); Though Obama Had to Leave to 
Find Himself, It Is Hawaii That Made His Rise Possible, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2008), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/23/AR2008082301620_3.html. 
 140. This trend began with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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wields immense powers, alerts us to the possibilities and complexities of 
our age.141 Old expectations and doctrines must be subject to the 
constantly changing evidence that we have before us. It is far better to 
engage with the possibilities of providing space for new politics to emerge 
than to accept the status quo or stew in despair. 
Besides, it could be argued who are the “we” and who are the “us” in 
today’s international affairs. The standard divisions are crumbling with 
every passing moment as globalization, mid-wifed by triumphant 
capitalism, takes unexpected twists and turns: Capitalist versus Socialist? 
East versus West? North versus South? Developed versus Developing? 
Black versus White? Rich versus Poor? The lines are not comfortably 
straight or solid, perhaps not even lines anymore. It is ironic that 
progressives of today sometime seem just as wedded to old, apparently 
stable, categories as conservatives were of old. But then again it must be 
asked: Conservatives versus Progressives? How stable are such categories 
anyway? 
A critical approach should be rooted in some notion of substantive 
justice, but it must also welcome destabilized categories and unexpected 
developments because those often contain the seeds of radical change. In a 
world where misery and violence are unwelcome constants for too many, 
change offers possibilities and hope. The greatest threat to creating a better 
future lies in a reflexive unwillingness to challenge institutions and 
processes that may not have been responsive in the past. It was a good 
thing that the United States armed forces, with the support of the United 
Nations, helped remove military and paramilitary forces from power in 
Haiti in 1994.142 It was a terrible thing that the world community aided 
President Aristide’s removal from office in 2004.143 It was a good thing 
that armed force was eventually used in the Balkans in 1998.144 It was a 
good thing that the city of Benghazi was saved from Gaddafi’s forces in 
 
 
 141. Alex Spillius, Barack Obama Fights Presidential Eligibility Claims, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 
2, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/4929005/Barack-Obama-fights-
presidential-eligibility-claims.html. This fringe group is called the “birthers” and makes such claims 
as, “Hawaii did not issue Obama a Certificate of Live Birth, they issued him a Certification of Live 
Birth.” FAQ’s, BIRTHERS.ORG, http://birthers.org/faqs/FAQ.html (last visited June 14, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 142. Robert I. Rotberg, Clinton Was Right, 102 FOREIGN POL’Y 135 (1996). 
 143. RANDALL ROBINSON, AN UNBROKEN AGONY (2007); Aristide Says U.S. Deposed Him in 
‘Coup d’Etat’, CNN (Mar. 2, 2004), http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/03/01/aristide 
claim. 
 144. Craig R. Whitney, Conflict in The Balkans: The Overview; NATO to Conduct Large 
Maneuvers to Warn Off Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/1998/06/12/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-conduct-large-maneuvers-warn-off-serbs.html. 
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2011 by United Nations-sanctioned NATO firepower.145 It would be bad 
if the United Nations, NATO, and other multinational institutions support 
the looting of Libya’s natural resources by corrupt domestic elites and 
multinational oil companies.146 It is a good thing that American forces are 
working with African Union forces to track Joseph Kony and his 
dwindling cadres of ignoble rebels.147 It would be terrible if these forces 
help tyrants like Uganda’s President Mousuveni or Rwanda’s President 
Kagame retain power undemocratically.148 
The key point is that bad results are not foreordained and do not turn on 
whether or not humanitarian intervention is good or bad in the abstract. 
The results depend on how those who are actively concerned work to 
manage interventions like these and how critically these actions are 
analyzed and challenged. One does not have to accept the stated 
motivations or believe in the moral standing of those who propose 
interventions. It is more important to develop principles of human 
coexistence that allow for critical analysis, evaluation, and dynamic 
mobilization. Progressives should engage in the ongoing dialogue and 
ensure their relevance. Their values may well persevere and prevail. 
2. The Problems of Indeterminacy and Incoherence 
This type of argument claims that there have been too many cases of 
similarly situated tragedies that inspire unequal international focus, 
condemnation, or demands for intervention. The doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention has been advocated and applied in an inconsistent manner 
while the problem has not been resolved by recasting the doctrine under 
the guise of responsibility to protect.149 For example, in the 1990s, the 
doctrine was applied in Somalia and Haiti but not in the case of Rwanda, 
 
 
 145. Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya, ECONOMIST (May 19, 2011), http://www 
.economist.com/node/18709571 (“The immediate goal of protecting Benghazi from massacre was 
achieved within days.”). 
 146. Intervention in Libya an Excuse to Plunder Resources, Cuba Tells UN, U.N. NEWS CTR. 
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39809. 
 147. Jeffrey Gettleman, In Vast Jungle, U.S. Troops Aid in Search of Kony, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/world/africa/kony-tracked-by-us-
forces-in-central-africa.html. 
 148. Andrew Rice, Made Man, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://news.jonzu 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Made-Man-M7.pdf; Richard Grant, Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s 
Redeemer or Ruthless Dictator?, TELEGRAPH (July 22, 2010), http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/world 
news/africaandindianocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html.  
 149. See Wallis, supra note 133.  
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where genocide proceeded despite sufficient warnings.150 In more recent 
times, the international community has been caught woefully unprepared 
to respond to a series of devastating conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
have resulted in massive social destruction and loss of life.151 Even more 
recently, the Arab Spring exposed the problem of inconsistency, as an ad-
hoc international coalition responded haphazardly with lethal force in 
Libya while allowing other similarly situated and lethal conflicts to 
proceed in Syria and Bahrain.152 Tragedies involving sustained and 
massive loss of life in Burma and North Korea have undermined the 
rationales for humanitarian intervention.153 
Whatever processes that exist for seeking and gaining humanitarian 
intervention seem driven more by press attention, propaganda, ideology, 
and dynamic calculations of national interests than by any objective 
evaluation of the enormity of humanitarian deprivation or the urgency of 
threats to human life. Underlying the doctrine’s inconsistent application 
are questions of the indeterminacy and incoherence of legal doctrines and 
procedures in general, and of humanitarian intervention in particular. 
These questions have not been resolved by the renaming of forcible 
intervention. 
The Responsibility to Protect Project responded to these concerns by 
outlining six criteria for military intervention: right authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable 
prospects.154 The Project’s identification of these criteria came with the 
diplomatic equivalent of a note of exuberance: “It is perhaps not as 
difficult as it appears at first sight to identify criteria for military 
intervention for humanitarian protection purposes about which people 
should be able to agree.”155 Their confidence ignores strong disagreements 
over whether there should ever be military interventions for humanitarian 
reasons and disagreements over the meaning, relative importance, and 
 
 
 150. MURPHY, supra note 79, at 244–56. 
 151. GARY STEWART & JOHN AMMAN, BLACK MAN’S GRAVE (2007); West Africa’s Wars: A 
Region In Flames, ECONOMIST (July 3, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1893195/; James 
Rupert, African Coups Upset March of Democracy, WASH. POST, June 29, 1997, at A20. 
 152. Mark Adomanis, A Tale of Two Repressions: Bahrain and Syria, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/02/13/a-tale-of-two-repressions-bahrain-and-syria/. 
 153. See, e.g., NANCY HUDSON-RODD ET AL., INT’L LAB. ORG., STATE INDUCED VIOLENCE AND 
POVERTY IN BURMA (2004), available at www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/State-induced_violence_ and_ 
poverty.pdf; Julian Ryall, North Korea’s Undercover Journalists Reveal Misery of Life in 
Dictatorship, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/south 
korea/8165274/North-Koreas-undercover-journalists-reveal-misery-of-life-in-dictatorship.html. 
 154. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 4.15–4.31, 4.33–4.36, 4.37–4.38, 4.39–4.40, 4.41–4.43. 
 155. Id. ¶ 4.15. 
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constitutive elements of each of these criteria. Their conclusions fail to 
appreciate the problems of indeterminacy and incoherence. 
The problems of indeterminacy and incoherence are firmly connected 
and feed off one another. No matter how specific the criteria for 
intervention are stated, the indeterminacy of these concepts in the abstract 
cannot be avoided. The aura of legality cannot mask the reality of 
international and domestic politics. The existing divisions within a 
particular society, including dynamic perceptions of interests not just by 
state parties but of a whole range of actors, inevitably will factor into any 
concrete application of these criteria. If only terms like genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, and failed state would make the journey from definition to 
application, with the ease with which bureaucrats intone them.156  
Incoherence speaks first to the inherent difficulties of justifying the use 
of armed force—war, to put it directly—for supposedly humanitarian 
reasons. Here, several of the stated criteria are implicated, but the 
proportionality question looms large. Put bluntly, how much destruction 
and how many people may intervening forces kill in the name of saving 
other people?157 This concern exists even if the use of force is thoroughly 
legitimate under “right authority,” and is regarded as “exceptional and 
extraordinary,”158 in response to ongoing international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and large scale ethnic cleansing.159 
Surely the lessons of humanitarianism are weakened when human life is 
deliberately taken even if in the service of saving others. Besides, on a 
practical level, once the facts of violence and destruction are exposed, 
objective assessments of motives and legitimacy become more difficult 
and unstable in the minds of witnesses. Violence and death are thus more 
apt to be seen in their stark quantitative relativity.  
Incoherence is also found in the privileging of when and how people 
die or suffer. The predicates of humanitarian intervention relegate an 
enormous quantity and variety of human suffering to the jurisdiction of 
human rights, and thus accept them as normal and tolerable on an 
everyday basis, as not necessarily the result of emergencies or deliberate 
governmental failures. We must question why we occasionally decide to 
 
 
 156. As Cass Sunstein states about the concept of rights, “The right must be specified in order to 
have concrete meaning. The specification will depend on premises not contained within the 
announcement of the right itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
727, 730 (1995). 
 157. See Engle, supra note 68. 
 158. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 4.17–4.18 (“Military intervention for human protection 
purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary measure . . . .”). 
 159. Engle, supra note 68, at 213–16, 224–26. 
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employ great drama, including military force, to save some sets of people, 
when we tolerate ongoing human suffering, misery, and deaths on an even 
greater scale. Is the spectacle of particular situations, as presented to us by 
media or skillful lobbying, sufficient to normatively separate the fates of 
some from those of others? Is the very definition of humanitarian 
emergency and imminence designed to mask the complicity of global 
arrangements, which condition us to accept widespread and bottomless 
misery, if accomplished with dignified silence?  
The critique of incoherence (and indeterminacy) attacks the optimistic 
view that the international community, however defined, could abstractly 
define and consistently employ concepts such as humanitarianism or 
intervention in particular situations. These terms and their definitions 
contain important and controversial assumptions about the way the world 
is and ought to be. Employing the language of legality and expending 
substantial resources in codifying criteria for action will not obviate 
inevitable conflicts over resources, privileges, and power. 
3. The Problem of Efficacy/Resource Allocation 
Even if one accepts the motivation of those behind humanitarian 
interventions and discounts the problems of inconsistency, 
indeterminancy, and incoherence, there are still questions about whether 
interventions are an effective means to aid those in crises. Humanitarian 
interventions often require massive deployments of human and material 
resources to support the intervening forces as well as to pacify the sites of 
intervention.160 Many opponents of interventions question whether this 
form of assistance represents the best allocation of scarce resources in the 
world community.161  
In the first place, despite the enormous sums required to wage such 
interventions, they are generally not designed to deal with the root causes 
of conflicts.162 Their immediate goal is a temporary halt to conflicts that 
are seen as endangering people and good order. Interventions are at best 
 
 
 160. Benjamin A. Valentino, The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 
67–69 (2011). 
 161. See Finnemore, supra note 74, at 217. “Some inadequacies are clear and have been widely 
discussed: [international organizations] have insufficient resources and some, like the UN, were not 
designed for the kinds of military missions with which they have been charged in recent years.” Id. See 
also Valentino, supra note 160, at 69–73. “Although these costs may seem low in absolute terms, in 
comparison to the other ways the United States’ scarce resources might have been spent to save lives 
abroad, humanitarian intervention begins to look almost extravagant.” Id. at 68–69. 
 162. See Valentino, supra note 160, at 66–68. 
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very costly short-term efforts designed to buy time to come up with longer 
term solutions. There is also the concern that armed interventions could 
result in hardened positions, escalated conflicts, and a deepening of the 
divisions that led to the crises in the first place.163 Furthermore, one may 
question why the willingness to invest great resources in military 
intervention is not matched by a willingness to deploy sufficient resources 
to deal with foundational problems underlying the crises over the long 
term and well before emergencies arise.164 
V. ENHANCING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE: 
INCORPORATING A DUTY TO AID 
 The question of action to protect civilians inside states has long 
been fraught with controversy. Yet it is being recognised more and 
more widely that the question is better framed not as one of a right 
to intervene, but of our responsibility to protect—a responsibility 
borne, first and foremost, by states. The panel members . . . have 
agreed that the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs 
cannot be used to protect those who commit genocide, large-scale 
ethnic cleansing, or other comparable atrocities.165 
The Responsibility to Protect Project tries to deal with legal and policy 
concerns by locating humanitarian intervention within a more 
comprehensive understanding of collective responsibility. However, the 
effort falls quite short. The commission’s usage of the term 
“responsibility” in this context suggests much more than it actually 
delivers. The responsibility to protect reformulation sought to develop 
international political consensus by providing more content to the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention as well as broader procedural involvement on 
the part of the international community. It embraced three specific 
components of responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, 
responsibility to react, and responsibility to build.166 The elaboration of 
these three components is valuable to the discourse of intervention and 
 
 
 163. Id. at 63–66. 
 164. Id. at 69–70. 
 165. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, Op-Ed., Courage to Fulfill our Responsibilities, 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/3445764. This op-ed was in response to 
the 2004 report of a “High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” that the Secretary-
General had set up in 2003. The report was entitled, “A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility.” 
 166. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at xi. 
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collective responsibility. It reminds the international community of the 
factual arc of crisis and the complexity of intervention politics. Clearly, as 
the subsequent U.N. debates showed, the effort needs much more before it 
can be accepted by communities, including progressives, that remain 
deeply skeptical of the motives and goals of those who come bearing aid 
behind the barrel of a gun.167 
As it is, the old and discredited assertion of an indeterminate and 
incoherent right of the more powerful to intervene among the less 
powerful for supposedly humanitarian reasons is now couched in the new 
language of responsibility. If substance is to prevail over form, and if we 
are to take seriously the necessity of coming to the aid of other humans in 
tremendous distress, the policy demands substantial refinements. 
The responsibility to protect is, admittedly, a more benign-sounding 
recasting of humanitarian intervention, but substantively, it needs 
something beyond an ambiguous language of responsibility to even justify 
current practices.168 As it is now conceived, it is exactly what the 
international community claims to do today, and that it does quite poorly.  
Calling the doctrine a reformulation is not meant to suggest that the 
effort was not valuable—it could be the beginning of the political dialogue 
needed to redefine global responsibilities.169 The issue is less one of a 
responsibility (as presently conceived) than that of a duty. As one scholar 
puts it, “the responsibility to protect creates no further legal obligation on 
states. The concept avoids the language of legal obligations, relying 
 
 
 167. For examples of objections raised during these debates, see U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 86th 
plen. mtg. at 4, 10, 14, 23, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 89th plen. 
mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.89 (Apr. 8, 2005) (the representative from Vietnam was not 
“convinced that responsibility to protect is an emerging norm of international law.”). The Cuban 
Representative addressed hypocrisies of proponents of R2P and stated, “It would be suicidal to endorse 
the so-called right to intervention, which so often has been used in recent times in the context of a 
unipolar, neo-liberal global order.” Id. at 12. See also Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect 
and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84 INT’L AFF. 615, 617. 
[M]any governments continue to suspect that R2P is simply a “Trojan horse” for the 
legitimization of unilateral intervention. On the other hand, some supporters of R2P argue 
that the principle that emerged from the 2005 World Summit was inadequate because it did 
not provide clear guidance about the circumstances in which coercive military intervention 
might be justified . . . . 
Id. 
 168. As the Algerian Representative stated during the General Assembly debates on the 
responsibility, “[It] is extremely difficult to distinguish from the idea of humanitarian intervention 
which the countries of the South formally rejected in 1999. . . . It would be overly hasty to define the 
‘responsibility to protect’ as a new norm prescribing an international collective obligation.” U.N. 
GAOR, 59th Sess., 86th plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6, 2005). 
 169. Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 703, 712–13 (2007). 
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instead on the weaker notion of responsibility.”170 The thin notion of 
responsibility that is promoted in the responsibility to protect doctrine is 
unlikely to gain the legitimacy needed to make a difference in global 
responses to humanitarian tragedies where military force would be 
essential to save large numbers of people. The doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention or responsibility to protect must be shorn of its false attitude 
of noblesse oblige on the part of the “civilized” who must periodically 
unleash their conscience in order to help the “savages” recover their 
humanity. The doctrine cannot gain legitimacy if it operates in isolation 
from the everyday existence of misery and tragedies that characterize our 
world. Only an acceptance of a broader and deeper common responsibility 
for the world that we have created will do so. 
However, the duty to engage in collective humanitarian intervention is 
not as well developed as the right to do so. Traditional understandings of 
state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in essentially 
domestic matters have served as durable legal barriers.171 The 
Responsibility to Protect report focused on the right of the international 
community, cast albeit as a responsibility, to act against national 
sovereignty interests, where necessary, to protect and assist vulnerable 
populations on humanitarian grounds.172 Arguably this recasting of the 
right to intervene as a responsibility to protect measurably moved the 
needle in the direction of a duty to act. Yet, the report reflected the work of 
a political body that went as far as it could go in an attempt to craft a 
binding legal obligation absent political consensus.173 The result did not 
directly engage the urgent matter of whether there should be a legal 
obligation on the part of the international community to engage in 
humanitarian intervention. It certainly did not adequately engage the 
important issue of responsibility for the root causes of crises that lead to 
demands for humanitarian intervention.174 Engaging the latter would have 
 
 
 170. Payandeh, supra note 48, at 514. 
 171. See Eaton, supra note 105, at 795–98. Opponents of a more detailed and expansive 
responsibility to protect doctrine fear that misuse of the doctrine will “legitimize unilateral coercive 
measures or intervention in the internal affairs of States.” U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 5, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009) (statement of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement). 
They based this objection on principles of “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
States, non-interference in their internal affairs, and respect for fundamental human rights.” Id. at 6. 
 172. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 2.7–2.15, 2.25–2.33. “What has been gradually emerging is 
a parallel transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international 
accountability.” Id. ¶ 2.18. 
 173. For an overview of the lack of consensus surrounding the issue, see Eaton, supra note 105, at 
784–98. 
 174. The responsibility to prevent component of the responsibility to protect adopts too narrow an 
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provided a pathway toward a sovereignty-trumping rationale for 
humanitarian intervention. As such, the report did not propose a duty to 
act to ameliorate actions and conditions that develop and sustain 
seemingly tolerable widespread misery and violence. However, the report 
should be credited with opening up for examination the question of such a 
duty as an integral part of the emerging norm of responsibility to protect.  
This Article makes two arguments in this section. First, it will argue for 
a duty to supplement the right, to engage in traditional humanitarian 
intervention. Second, it will argue for an even broader duty to act before 
crises develop, a common obligation to confront what is now seemingly 
tolerable widespread misery. A duty of humanitarian intervention or even 
its thinner version, the responsibility to protect, will not be sustainable 
absent a broader duty to aid those in extreme distress. The plight of these 
people does not satisfy the standards of the responsibility to protect 
doctrine. The language of duty, as opposed to the language of right, 
creates a better balance between those who have the capacity to act and 
those on whose behalf they could claim to be acting. The concept of duty 
in this context would create a thicker, prescriptive version of the 
responsibility to protect.175 Crucially, a failure to act under either 
formulation of duty posited here should result in substantive 
consequences. A legal obligation should create rights for those aggrieved 
by bad acts or failures to act to seek redress.176 
A. Toward A Duty of Humanitarian Intervention 
 But in recent years, some of the more urgent criticisms 
concerning intervention are directed not at unjustified interventions 
but at the failure to intervene to protect human rights. The case of 
Rwanda is an obvious example.177 
 
 
understanding of root causes. It is focused on preventing crises from developing but not on curtailing 
more fundamental faults. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 3.2, 3.18–3.24. 
 175. See Tan, supra note 19, on the moral obligation to protect. 
 176. BLACK’S includes in its definition of “obligation” that: 
“[T]he term obligation is in law the name, not merely of the duty, but also of the correlative 
right. It denotes the legal relation or vinculum juris in its entirety, including the right of the 
one party, no less than the liability of the other. Looked at from the point of view of the 
person entitled, an obligation is a right . . . .”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 460 (Glanville 
L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)).  
 177. Tan, supra note 19, at 84.  
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When should we call in the troops?178 Professors Kok-Chor Tan and 
Carla Bagnoli have examined the moral dimension of the duty to 
protect.179 Professor Tan agrees that the ICISS report on the responsibility 
to protect advances the debate towards a duty to protect by making the 
case for the right to intervene. Tan argues, “establishing the permissibility 
of intervention, is, of course, a necessary first step toward showing its 
obligatory character . . . .”180 But Tan also points out that “permissibility 
alone does not necessarily generate an obligation.”181 However, Tan 
argues that under the stringent criteria of humanitarian intervention, “a 
permissible intervention must also be obligatory.”182 Tan asserts:  
If rights violations are severe enough to override the sovereignty of 
the offending state, which is a cornerstone ideal in international 
affairs, the severity of the situation should also impose an obligation 
on other states to end the violation. If the right of the offending state 
to nonintervention may be overruled in the name of human rights, 
so too, it seems to me, may the right of other states to stay 
disengaged.183 
Tan concedes that the duty to act under his formulation is an imperfect 
duty, citing an argument made by Michael Walzer: “The general problem 
is that intervention, even when justified . . . is an imperfect duty—a duty 
that doesn’t belong to any particular agent. Someone ought to intervene, 
but no specific state in the society of states is morally bound to do so.”184 
Thus there is an agency problem. However, the imperfection problem of 
this obligation does not arise if the duty is seen to rest squarely on the 
United Nations, the international body that encompasses the collectivity of 
the globe and is charged with principal responsibility for the preservation 
and promotion of peace, security, and human rights. 
For Professor Carla Bagnoli, “there is a strict moral duty to intervene 
when fundamental human rights are violated.”185 In her view, “neutrality 
is morally culpable and blameworthy.”186 Bagnoli starts from a Kantian 
 
 
 178. This question is specifically asked in Engle, supra note 68.  
 179. See Tan, supra note 19; Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention As a Perfect Duty: A 
Kantian Argument, in 47 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS, supra note 3, at 117. 
 180. Tan, supra note 19, at 88. 
 181. Id. at 89. 
 182. Id. at 90. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 94–95; see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS xiii (1977). 
 185. Bagnoli, supra note 179, at 118. 
 186. Id. at 119. 
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understanding of humanity as “what characterizes us as persons . . . 
[consisting of] the capacity to decide what is valuable and what is not.”187 
She argues, “human rights are ways to express our humanity . . . the duty 
to intervene proceeds from respect for humanity.”188 Unlike Tan, she sees 
this duty as a perfect duty—one of justice, not mercy or charity, and one 
that is independent of special relationships or considerations such as 
proximity, friendship, capability, expertise, or effectiveness.189 Rather, 
“[i]t is a perfect duty whose performance is morally obligatory. It is a duty 
that proceeds from respect for humanity.”190 According to Professor 
Bagnoli, precisely because the duty to intervene is a perfect one, the 
proper authority for exercising it must reside in an international 
organization.191 
Professors Tan and Bagnoli did not address the legal or political basis 
for the duty to protect. However, a collective international legal and 
political obligation to act in the face of human calamity could be traced to 
one of the most significant developments of the human rights era, the 
Genocide Convention of 1948.192 Additional legal doctrinal support for 
such a responsibility could be found in the panoply of other international 
human rights and humanitarian agreements that has emerged since the end 
of World War II.193 
The Genocide Convention, one of the first treaties to emerge from the 
devastation of World War II, did more than highlight communal horror at 
the carnage of total warfare. It also reaffirmed the intimate connections 
between international disorder and the way a state treats its inhabitants. It 
reflected a conviction that the defense of human dignity, even across 
sovereign international boundaries, is essential to maintaining 
international peace and security.194 The Convention consciously made 
genocide a crime under international law “whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war.”195 Critical to the argument here, the Convention 
also created a responsibility “to prevent and punish” on the part of the 
parties to the Convention and the international community in general.196 
 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 120–21. 
 190. Id. at 125. 
 191. Id. at 136. 
 192. Genocide Convention, supra note 11. 
 193. See id.; Payandeh, supra note 48. 
 194. Genocide Convention, supra note 11; see also U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 195. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art. I. 
 196. Id. 
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This responsibility to prevent and punish, coupled with the comprehensive 
definition of the crime of genocide itself and the broad set of punishable 
ancillary acts, established a high standard of international responsibility to 
protect victims of the most serious human rights abuses.197 Any 
strengthening of the norm of humanitarian intervention or the 
responsibility to protect cannot be disconnected from this philosophical 
and doctrinal heritage. Today, the crime of genocide is without question 
the most odious expression of international criminality—a first among the 
category of peremptory norms of general international law or jus 
cogens.198 
The U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
subsequent standard-setting human rights treaties of the era have also 
helped to erase the legal and political barriers to collective transnational 
humanitarian intervention.199 These normative achievements impel us 
further toward an understanding of human rights that promotes legal 
responsibility in the full sense of the term.200 They obligate us to engage in 
humanitarian intervention in crisis situations when necessary and also to 
act more broadly to ameliorate serious, persistent, and pervasive violations 
of human rights that have not yet reached current definitions of a crisis. It 
is essential that human rights principles, not just humanitarian 
expectations, factor into the decisions of when and where to send in the 
troops.201  
In conventional discourse, human rights treaties have been interpreted 
to make national governments primarily responsible for the defense and 
 
 
 197. Id. arts. II–VI. 
 198. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 68 (1996) (“The legal literature discloses that the following international crimes are jus 
cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related 
practices, and torture.”). 
 199. See Teson, supra note 111, at 336 (“The content and purpose of state sovereignty have 
undergone profound changes since 1945, and more dramatically since 1989. Human beings have 
claims against their own states and governments that the international community cannot merely 
ignore.”). See also ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 6.2–6.11. “In the field of state-citizen relations, 
the totality of Charter clauses and instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights restrict 
the authority of states to cause harm to their own people within territorial borders.” Id. ¶ 6.10. 
 200. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) defines “responsibility” as “liability” and includes 
in its definition: “‘Responsibility means answerability or accountability.’” (quoting ROLLIN M. 
PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 399 (5th 
ed. 1977)). 
 201. “It would be a very narrow definition of justice indeed which would not include human rights 
in any context.” Teson, supra note 111, at 340. 
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fulfillment of human rights.202 This is also the case with humanitarian 
norms.
203
 Thus, while human rights standards were mostly conceived, 
established, or promoted internationally, their realization was, in concept, 
left primarily to national capabilities. The development and spread of 
international non-governmental organizations have helped to moderate this 
division of responsibilities, but they have not eliminated it.204 This 
bifurcation between the international and national has rebounded to the 
benefit of both malevolent domestic elites and politically and 
economically powerful transnational interests. Their combined short-term 
political and economic interests have supported this amoral, facile, and 
ultimately destabilizing division of what should be global communal 
responsibilities.205  
Thus, under the current operative regime, developed nations and, in 
particular, their multinational corporate entities, have retained flexibility to 
defend and promote narrow national or corporate interests while preaching 
broader abstract and often quite noble global rules.206 They have avoided 
specific responsibility for consequences (political, economic, and 
environmental, for example) outside their formal legal jurisdiction.207 No 
conception of sovereignty or human rights has prevented them from acting 
 
 
 202. See generally Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, 3 HEALTH & 
HUM. RTS. 145 (1998). 
 203. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC] (July 31, 
2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. 
 204. See generally Amanda Murdie, The Impact of Human Rights NGO Activity on Human Rights 
Practices, 4 INT’L NGO J. 421 (2009). 
 205. See CATHERINE AGG, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT 
SUPPORT FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (Civil Soc’y & Soc. Movements Programme 
Paper No. 23, 2006), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/un 
pan040102.pdf. 
 206. For example, businesses can now participate in the Global Compact, where they can 
“voluntarily align their operations with ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labour 
standards, the environment and anti-corruption . . .” Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell, Introduction: the 
United Nations Global Compact—Retrospect and Prospect, in THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
COMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 1, 4 (Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell eds., 
2010). However, one need only to look at the support Shell Oil is receiving in the U.S. Supreme Court 
from governments attempting to limit liability with regards to human rights to see that narrow interests 
are still very much at work. Shell Oil is a participant in the Global Compact. See Rosaria Burchielli & 
Annie Delaney, Oil for Lives? When Governments Help Bad Corporations, CONVERSATION (June 25, 
2012), http://theconversation.edu.au/oil-for-lives-when-governments-help-bad-corporations-7634; 
Rebekah Kebede, Shell Nigeria Case May Temper Big Oil Policies, REUTERS, June 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/18/us-nigeria-abuses-settlement-analysis-idUS 
TRE55H6A620090618.  
 207. U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights: Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 8th Sess., ¶¶ 12–
16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
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to protect their particular interests or promote their agenda-of-the-moment 
in foreign lands. Instead, they eagerly hide behind a limited conception of 
national jurisdiction or sovereignty to avoid responsibility for human 
suffering and deaths in other places.208 Their intimate roles in developing 
and maintaining the structures of global suffering are thus hidden in legal 
shadows.  
For a time, the politics of the Cold War made it difficult to grapple 
with the inconsistencies between noble pronouncements and actual 
practices.209 Now, in the post post-Cold War period, the global community 
should be expected to return to the unfinished business of building the 
architecture of collective international responsibility, going beyond narrow 
and myopic formulations. There is an opportunity now to bridge the divide 
between those who demand action against calamity and spectacular 
oppression and those who remain deeply skeptical of such actions because 
of the dangers of foreign interventions. As for those who are motivated by 
other goals, be it isolationism or imperial domination, they are unlikely to 
accept any efforts to develop legal standards that could regulate the 
abilities of the more powerful to act in their perceived interests.210  
Ideally, an international agreement would be developed to confer on 
the U.N. an explicit obligation to intervene that integrates and enhances 
the responsibility to protect. Such an agreement would build on the work 
of the drafters of the responsibility to protect. The ICISS commission and 
subsequent U.N. deliberations were careful to contain the responsibility to 
protect doctrine to extreme cases, and to provide for a process that would 
 
 
 208. See Burchielli & Delaney, supra note 206. The most recent case to develop this issue is 
Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., 569 U.S. ____ (2013) (No. 10-1491), slip opinion 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/10-1491_l6gn.pdf. 
 209. It is no surprise that the government of South Africa was perfecting racism under the policy 
of apartheid even as it played a role in the development of the UDHR in 1948. See, e.g., Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949; Population Registration Act 30 of 1950. South Africa did abstain 
from voting on the UDHR in the General Assembly. Peter Bailey, The Creation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, UNIVERSALRIGHTS.NET, http://www.universalrights.net/main/creation 
.htm. 
 210. Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05%5B1%5D.pdf. U.S. opposition to constraints on the ability of 
the United States to act as it chooses in international relations (expressed in the Bolton letter) is an old 
one that has been in tension with U.S. calls for international law. 
In an early manifestation of concerns that would come to the fore during the George W. Bush 
administration, the Clinton Administration in the United States opposed criteria that could 
constrain its freedom of action and create a legal obligation for the United States to intervene 
where the proposed criteria were met. 
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 96, at 1218 (footnote omitted). See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, 
supra note 81. See also MOYNIHAN, supra note 70, at 120–77. 
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leave the decision over when force is to be employed in the hands of the 
most powerful states.211 Emphasis was placed on strengthening national 
power over citizens under the guise of encouraging government 
responsibility for the welfare of people.212 International responsibility was 
secondary and contingent. Incorporating a more meaningful international 
obligation to act would provide more balance to this process. If the failure 
of national governments to be responsible incurs the cost of reducing their 
national sovereignty, failure of the international community to respond 
should also have consequences. This change would enrich and strengthen 
a culture of collective responsibility. It would also push the international 
community to act urgently to deal with developing crises and indeed to be 
more fully engaged well before situations get to the crisis stage.213 
The surest way to make such an obligation consequential for those 
victimized by the failure to intervene or by inadequate intervention is to 
give victims a substantial remedy. Take, for example, Rwandans, who had 
to settle for after-the-fact apologies from President Clinton and the UN.214 
Post-atrocity apologies, international tribunals, and self-criticism should at 
least be supplemented by legal sanctions against those who were broadly 
complicit or those who had the responsibility to act but failed to do so. In 
addition, there should be a legal determination of injury as well as material 
compensation for those individuals and groups harmed by the collective 
failure to act. Accountability for consequences of a failure to act could be 
realized, for example, through a new international agreement that could 
provide for access to the International Court of Justice, either through an 
advisory opinion or by way of a complaint brought by a state party.215 
What fundamentally separates this thicker version of responsibility, 
better called duty, from the current conception of responsibility to protect 
 
 
 211. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 4.10–4.17, 4.39–4.43; 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra 
note 45, paras. 138–39. 
 212. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 2.14–2.23. 
 213. See Tessa Davis, Note, Taking International Law at Its Word and Its Spirit: Re-Envisioning 
Responsibility to Protect as a Binding Principle of International Law, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 
906–09. “[N]ations must inevitably realize they have already made the commitment to act.” Id. at 909. 
 214. International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, G.A. Res. 58/234, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/234 (Dec. 23, 2003); President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to 
Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials (Mar. 25, 
1998), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/03/1998-03-25-remarks-by-the-president-to-genocide 
-survivors.html. 
 215. See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 34, 36, 65, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. This author fully appreciates the tremendous difficulties that would confront any 
effort at true international accountability. The critical point made here is that without such 
accountability, humanitarian intervention would continue to be deprived of the legitimacy it deserves 
within a broad segment of the international community, including Western progressives.  
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is what happens when there is a failure to act. By explicitly allowing 
consequences to be determined through a legal process, the international 
community’s duty to act would adjust the current balance that is heavy 
with rhetoric and regret but light on real actions. Current international 
structures are supported in their incapacity or unwillingness to act both by 
those who benefit from crises as well as those who are ambivalent toward 
military intervention. They have little incentive to change. 
Collective consequences would be a far better measure of the state of 
human rights and humanitarian standards than the rather obscene 
obsession with international trials for the very few who are later identified 
as appropriate culprits. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, operating out 
of the International Criminal Court, for example, has tried and convicted 
Charles Taylor for his role in the brutal conflicts that engulfed a broad 
slice of West Africa for more than a decade.216 Yet that decade-long 
conflict was fueled largely by the substitution of gem diamonds as 
currency to purchase weapons and other attributes of raw power. It would 
be absurd to suggest a resolution of the conflicts without casting a broader 
net of responsibility for those who fostered the conflict from afar and 
those who failed to come to the aid of the millions victimized even when 
the costs of such assistance were relatively low. Such superficial 
interventions as we now have set the stage for other rounds of similarly 
motivated conflicts. The shame of our collective failures will not be erased 
by the central role given to the prosecution of a few warlords after the fact. 
The victims would be better served by having their claims against the 
complicit and those that failed to assist them heard in an international 
forum. 
B. Towards A Broader Collective Duty To Assist in International Affairs 
 Each day, some 50,000 human beings—mostly children, mostly 
female and mostly people of color—die from starvation, diarrhea, 
pneumonia, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, perinatal conditions and 
other poverty–related causes . . . . 
. . . This catastrophe [of vast poverty] was and is happening, 
foreseeably, under a global institutional order designed for the 
benefit of the affluent countries’ governments, corporations and 
 
 
 216. Taylor Convicted of Sierra Leone Crimes, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.usa 
today.com/news/world/story/2012-04-26/taylor-war-crimes/54549300/1; Press Release, Int’l Crim. 
Ct., The Special Court for Sierra Leone to use ICC Facilities for Trial of Charles Taylor (June 21, 
2006, Press Release ICC-20060621-140). 
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citizens and of the poor countries’ political and military elites. . . . 
Even now severe poverty could be rapidly reduced through feasible 
reforms that would modify the more harmful features of this global 
order or mitigate their impact.217 
1. Accepting Political Responsibility 
“There are no innocents. There are, however, different degrees of 
responsibility.”218 
To make a legitimate case for collective international responsibility to 
engage in humanitarian intervention in extreme cases, the responsibility to 
protect doctrine should be broadened to include a duty to act also against 
non-spectacular, everyday, entrenched instances of violence and misery. 
The work of political philosopher Iris Marion Young219 provides a helpful 
foundation for such a re-conceptualization of international responsibility.  
Professor Young has written about the need for a deeper acceptance of 
collective political responsibility for the global environment that has made 
crises and widespread deprivation a constant of our existence.220 She calls 
this environment one of structural social injustice.221 She asks specifically, 
“[h]ow should agents think about responsibility in relation to structural 
social injustice?”222 Professor Young developed a theory of “political 
responsibility” as distinct from the more widely accepted “liability model 
of responsibility” as one answer.223 Her elaboration of political 
 
 
 217. Thomas Pogge, Recognized and Violated By International Law: The Human Rights of the 
Global Poor (2005), reprinted in STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 311, 
312 (3d ed. 2007). 
 218. STIEG LARSSON, THE GIRL WHO PLAYED WITH FIRE 323 (Reg Keeland trans. 2010) (2006). 
 219. Cass Sunstein called Marion Young “one of the most important political philosophers of the 
past quarter-century.” She died in 2006. Iris Marion Young, 1949–2006, UNIV. CHI. NEWS OFFICE 
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/06/060802.young.shtml. 
 220. Young, supra note 21. See generally YOUNG, supra note 22. 
 221. Young, supra note 21, passim. 
 222. Id. at 388. 
 223. Young distinguishes between the two models in five respects:  
(1) Unlike responsibility as liability, political responsibility does not isolate some 
responsibility parties in order to absolve others. (2) Whereas blame or liability seeks remedy 
for a deviation from an acceptable norm, usually by an event that has reached a terminus, with 
political responsibility we are concerned with structural causes of injustice that are normal 
and ongoing. (3) Political responsibility is more forward-looking than backward-looking. (4) 
What it means to take up or assign political responsibility is more open and discretionary than 
what it means to hold an agent blameworthy or liable. (5) An agent shares political 
responsibility with others whose actions contribute to the structural processes that produce 
injustice. 
Id. 
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responsibility provides a theoretical approach that frees domestic as well 
as international institutions from the traditional constraints on thinking 
about international relations. Such restraints undergird the tragically thin 
notion of communal obligation that is at the heart of the responsibility to 
protect norm.  
As Professor Young describes it, political responsibility is not limited 
by “the boundaries of a state or political jurisdiction” because structural 
injustice is within and across national boundaries and its scope is derived 
“from the connections generated by the structural processes.”224 Young 
provides a substantive vision of transnational responsibility that moves the 
discourse of responsibility toward what should be properly called a duty or 
obligation to act. Even though this understanding of responsibility is not 
based on a liability model, it is similar enough to create a parallel to 
municipal tort regimes that come with concrete consequences for failure to 
act where there is a duty. 
Young’s concept of political responsibility speaks to both the narrow 
justifications for international collective actions adopted by the drafters of 
the ICISS report and the broader obligation to act before the rather regular 
spectacular manifestations of structural injustices occur. Her conception of 
political responsibility would allow us to transcend the limitations of the 
“core principles” of the responsibility to protect outlined in the original 
ICISS report,225 as well as the result of the U.N. debates on the doctrine 
that took place in 2005 and 2009.226 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. ICISS REPORT, supra note 83, at xi. 
 226. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 45, paras. 138–39. 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General 
Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
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The authors of the Responsibility to Protect report did not directly 
confront the overwhelming evidence of the role that structural social 
injustice plays in developing, nurturing, and defending the everyday 
culture of acceptable misery policed by necessary violence.227 For one 
thing, they deliberately relegated human rights norms to secondary 
considerations while reaffirming traditional and narrow humanitarian 
considerations. Their conception of responsibility retains the position that 
humanitarian intervention is justified only in response to a particular 
species of extraordinary wrongs in an otherwise not-so-bad international 
community. Every call for humanitarian intervention in this scheme is thus 
appreciated as a separate, unique episode or a discrete instance of failure 
on the part of an otherwise acceptable global structure. In this light, the 
very adoption of a compromised and thin conception of responsibility 
covers up the breadth and depth of foundational issues and structural 
injustice. Their conclusions, therefore, help to absolve those arguably most 
responsible because of direct action, deliberate indifference to human 
suffering, complicity, or just plain unwillingness to act.  
The original ICISS report could thus be seen as the diplomatic 
equivalent of “putting lipstick on a pig.”228 The lipstick in this case is 
humanitarian intervention, a much-discredited doctrine among all except 
the poor unfortunate masses who, in despair, sometimes turn to it in last 
ditch efforts to defend against certain destruction.229 The pig is, of course, 
 
 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
Id. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). After extensive debates on the Secretary-
General’s report, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution that took note of the report and 
committed itself to keep discussing the responsibility to protect. Thus to the extent that there is an 
international political consensus, it is to the effect the responsibility to protect exists, and that it is 
probably legitimate only if confined to instances of violations of specific humanitarian laws: genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 
3, 6, 13, 18, 23, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 2009). 
 227. Arguably the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild are components of the 
responsibility to protect that speak toward a broader conception of responsibility. Yet, it must be noted 
that none of these components are obligatory on the part of the international community. 
 228. The earliest use of this specific expression of the futility of trying to change the essence of 
something unpleasant, to make pretty something that is ugly, or to convert something that is useless to 
useful has been traced to a 1985 article in the Washington Post. See Ben Zimmer, Who First Put 
“Lipstick on a Pig”?, SLATE (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
explainer/2008/09/who_first_put_lipstick_on_a_pig.html. Zimmer’s occasion for writing was a mild 
controversy that had followed then-candidate Barack Obama’s use of the expression. 
 229. See, e.g., Syrian Opposition Calls for International Military Intervention, CNN (Mar. 12, 
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the world of misery and violence that is being covered up. The subsequent 
U.N. debates on the doctrine essentially exposed the insufficiency of the 
cover up. Many who were opposed to keeping the world as it is were not 
fooled. They hardly budged. Broadening and deepening international 
collective responsibility holds more promise to move the dialogue 
forward. 
2. Mapping the Structure of Global Social Injustice 
The evidence of global structural social injustice is so abundant that the 
matter of its existence and causes should be beyond dispute even if there is 
disagreement as to how to deal with its consequences. Numerous periodic 
reports from global institutions like the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), regional organizations, national 
authorities and nongovernmental organizations, and scholars in many 
disciplines testify comprehensively to the hardiness of misery in the 
world.230  
According to the most authoritative sources, somewhere between 40% 
and 50% of humanity lives in a state of poverty.231 This estimate is based 
on defining poor as those who live on less than $2.50 a day.232 Focusing 
on those considered to be abjectly poor, the number hovers around the 
20% mark, or over a billion people.233 Both the World Bank and the 
UNDP have generally employed income-based definitions of poverty to 
provide a picture of poverty and inequality in the world. In 1990, the 
UNDP began to issue the Human Development Report, its seminal 
 
 
2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-12/middleeast/world_meast_syria-unrest_1_idlib-syrian-national-
council-syrian-opposition; Douglas Hamilton, Syria Intervention Drive Mirrors Bosnia’s History, 
REUTERS, Feb. 19, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/19/us-syria-bosnia-
lessons-idUSTRE81I05920120219; Fatimah Shalash, Op-Ed, Violence in Libya Demands 
International Intervention, KY. KERNEL (Feb. 21, 2011), http://kykernel.com/2011/02/21/violence-in-
libya-demands-international-intervention; Alex De Waal, The Wrong Lessons: The Vanishing Legacy 
of Operation Restore Hope, BOS. REV. (Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004), http://bostonreview.net/BR28.6/ 
dewaal.html; Luke Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 1, 3 (2005), 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf. 
 230. See generally, e.g., 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35. The World Bank also 
publishes regular World Developments Reports. That these reports need to be published year after year 
illustrates the intractability of misery and the inadequacies of current politics.  
 231. Anup Shah, Poverty Facts and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.global 
issues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats#src1. The data comes from The World Bank’s world 
development indicators of 2008. See also 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35, at 8. 
 232. Shah, supra note 231. 
 233. Id. 
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publication on the human condition.234 Over more than two decades, the 
reports have tracked the state of humanity from a perspective that employs 
a broad and complex understanding of human development. They have 
provided highly regarded and vital maps of the structures of global social 
injustice. 
A core feature of the report is the Human Development Index (HDI), a 
set of comprehensive data on economic and social factors that has proven 
invaluable to scholars and policy-makers.235 The reports initially focused 
on income, health, and education factors in assessing the state of human 
development within and across countries, which is then captured in 
various indices that make up the HDI. However, in the 2010 Human 
Development Report, the HDI was broadened to reflect concerns that it 
“‘captures a few of people’s choices and leaves out many that people may 
value highly—economic, social and political freedom, and protection 
against violence, insecurity and discrimination . . . .’”236 The report 
conceded that “[s]ignificant aggregate progress in health, education and 
income is qualified by high and persistent inequality, unsustainable 
production patterns and disempowerment of large groups of people around 
the world.”237 It introduced three multidimensional measures of inequality 
and poverty to provide a better picture of the complex forces that have 
made global misery so resilient:238 
1. “The Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI), estimated for 139 
countries, captures the losses in human development due to 
inequality in health, education and income.”239 
 
 
 234. History of the Human Development Report, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, http://hdr. 
undp.org/en/humandev/reports (last visited July 8, 2012). Two renowned economists, Mahbub ul Haq 
and Amartya Sen, were the leading forces behind the reports that sought to put people at the center of 
discourse about economics and development. About Human Development, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORTS, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev (last visited July 8, 2012). 
 235. The report analyzes data on life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, school enrolment, and 
GDP per capita to come up with various rankings and indices, including a comprehensive HDI value 
for each country. Thus Norway, Sweden, and Canada were the top three HDI ranked countries in 2002 
with HDI values above 0.94. Sierra Leone, and Niger ranked at the bottom, with HDI values below 
0.30. U.N. Dev. Programme, Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, 2002 HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 149, 152 (2002). 
 236. 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35, at 85 (quoting U.N. Dev. Programme, 
1990 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 16). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 86. 
 239. Id. The IHDI is designed to be “directly comparable to the HDI, reflecting inequality in each 
dimension of the HDI for a large number of countries.” Id. at 87. However, “the IHDI takes into 
account not only a country’s average human development, as measured by health, education and 
income indicators, but also how it is distributed.” Id. Thus the “HDI can be viewed as an index of 
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2. “The Gender Inequality Index (GII), estimated for 138 countries, 
reveals gender disparities in reproductive health, empowerment and 
labour market participation.”240 
3. “The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifies 
overlapping deprivations suffered by households in health, 
education and living standards.”241 
These innovations were designed to better capture the “full picture” of 
deprivation that average statistics tend to minimize.242 The results 
affirmed even more graphically the breadth and depth of deprivation in a 
world of considerable abundance.  
Perhaps the index’s principal accomplishment is to show the many and 
complex ways in which poverty and inequality are developed and 
maintained among a solid proportion of humanity. It also provides 
substantial evidence of broad complicity and indifference among those 
who are prospering in the global environment where poverty and 
inequality thrive. All the indices suggest that those who were at the bottom 
of the well have generally stayed there. For example, “[p]eople in sub-
Saharan Africa suffer the largest HDI losses because of substantial 
inequality across all three dimensions, followed by South Asia and the 
Arab States.”243 On the other hand, “[p]eople in developed countries 
experience the least inequality in human development.”244 With regard to 
gender, the report confirmed a strong correlation “between gender 
inequality and the loss due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI. 
This suggests that countries with an unequal distribution of human 
development also experience high inequality between women and men and 
that countries with high gender inequality also have an unequal 
distribution of human development.”245  
 
 
‘potential’ human development (or the maximum IHDI that can be achieved if there were no 
inequality) while the IHDI is the actual level of human development (accounting for inequality).” Id. 
 240. Id. at 86. The GII includes “educational attainment, economic and political participation and 
female-specific health issues” and accounts “for overlapping inequalities at the national level.” Id. at 
89. The GII is designed to meet some of the criticisms directed at earlier measures such as the Gender 
Development Index (GDI), and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). It “captures the loss of 
achievement in key dimensions due to gender inequality.” Id. at 90. 
 241. Id. at 86. “The MPI is grounded in the capability approach. . . . [It] complements monetary-
based methods by taking a broader approach.” Id. at 94. 
 242. Id. at 85. 
 243. 2010 Human Development Report, supra note 35, at 87.  
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 93. 
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The MPI tracked measures of income-poverty while capturing 
“overlapping but still distinct aspects of poverty. Plotting the national 
headcounts of those who are income poor (using the $1.25 a day poverty 
line) against those who are multidimensionally poor shows that in most 
countries . . . the number of people who are multidimensionally poor is 
higher.”246 Further, the report found that the “aggregate estimate of 1.75 
billion multidimensionally poor people exceeds the 1.44 billion people 
estimated to be living on less than $1.25 a day in the same countries, but it 
is below the 2.6 billion people estimated to be living on less than $2 a 
day.”247 The report also tracked regional rates of multidimensional poverty 
and confirmed traditional expectations. The rate varied from “around 3 
percent in Europe and Central Asia to 65 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.”248 It also found that “South Asia is home to the largest number of 
people living in multidimensional poverty, followed by Sub-Saharan 
Africa.”249 
Thomas Pogge is a leading figure whose work has focused on the 
structural injustices that undergird these grave statistics.250 His moral, 
political, and legal arguments complement Professor Young’s idea of 
political responsibility. He argues that the persistence of abject misery is a 
direct and eminently foreseeable result of historical and contemporary 
political and economic choices on the part of dominant actors in the global 
community.251 His work deconstructs the architecture of rationalization 
that allows the rich to evade responsibility for the plight of the poor. He 
also exposes the intimate connections forged over time between the 
powerful in the developed world and domestic elites in the poor countries 
as wealth was extracted from the latter while misery and violence were left 
behind.252 Most critically, he rejects the notion that charity is a sufficient 
and effective substitute for responsibility owed.253 He urges moral, 
political, and legal responsibility on the part of the international 
 
 
 246. Id. at 96. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 97. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22; Thomas Pogge, Severe 
Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFFS. 55 (2005); Thomas Pogge, Severe 
Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES 
WHAT TO THE VERY POOR 11 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007). 
 251. Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, supra note 250, at 55. 
 252. Id. at 71–74. 
 253. Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, supra note 250, at 28–29. 
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community, specifically the rich countries, for the persistent state of 
human deprivation in the poorer countries.254 
The command responsibility of these transnational elite actors derives 
not only from acting to create the structures of violence and misery but 
also from deliberate failures to act to ameliorate the results of their 
wrongs—failures that in cases could amount to deliberate indifference.255 
Young’s argument for understanding political responsibility more broadly 
helps to bridge the gulf of suspicion undergirding the opposition to the use 
of force even in extreme cases. Understandably, many first want a 
demonstration of true community before accepting the episodic 
expressions of concern or solidarity behind calls for humanitarian 
intervention. 
In this vein, Nobel Prize winner Nadine Gordimer wrote in 1997 about 
Nigerian military dictator General Sani Abacha and the intimate 
connections between the global oil industry (the foundation of wealth and 
prosperity in many developed countries), on the one hand, and political 
repression, economic inequality, and environmental devastation that 
characterized Nigeria on the other.256 She pointed out that the oil fields 
managed by Western multinationals, like Shell Oil, provided 80% of the 
revenues of a military regime that persecuted human rights and 
environmental activists like Ken Saro Wiwa, and threatened oil industry 
workers with the death penalty for striking.257 Gordimer did not write 
about the overwhelming state of corruption that ensured gross poverty and 
inequality amidst enormous revenues for oil, but that has been chronicled 
by others.258 
Another article by New York Times reporter Howard French provided a 
broader picture of the deeply interconnected nature of wealth in the 
developed world with abject poverty and gross inequality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the poorest and most unequal region in the world.259 Mr. French 
wrote about Africa’s “geological scandals,” countries with abundant 
mineral resources that are beset by instability, violence, repression, 
 
 
 254. Id. passim. 
 255. See Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, supra note 250, at 78–83. 
 256. The celebrated Ken Saro Wiwa and many of his colleagues were executed by the regime 
despite international outcry. Nadine Gordimer, In Nigeria, the Price of Oil is Blood, N.Y. TIMES, May 
25, 1997, at E11. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See, e.g., POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 112–14 (2008). 
 259. Howard W. French, The Curse of Riches: In Africa, Wealth Often Buys Only Trouble, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/25/weekinreview/the-world-the-curse-of-
riches-in-africa-wealth-often-buys-only-trouble.html. 
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corruption, endemic poverty, and gross inequality.260 Countries such as 
Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan have experienced 
devastating civil wars fueled by transnational competition to control their 
natural resources, which, in many cases, were used to support the 
conflicts.261 Accoring to Mr. French, “judging from the experience of 
many countries, international business interests are acutely aware of the 
weaknesses in the political and economic systems of the new African 
countries, and rush to exploit them to their advantage whenever they 
can.”
262
 He noted the particular example of the French oil company, Elf, 
operating in the Republic of Congo, which provided large sums of money 
up front to contending groups in order to secure long-term contracts.263 
Another example he offered was the South Africa-based mining giant, 
Anglo-American, gaining a disputed contract to exploit copper and cobalt 
in the former Zaire shortly after one side emerged victorious from a brutal 
civil war.264 Mr. French also wrote about Westerners rushing to do 
business with the then-new government of Liberia under Charles 
Taylor.265 Taylor was subsequently convicted of war crimes by an 
international tribunal.266 
These examples provide additional evidence to support the 
comprehensive data on poverty and inequality collected by the UNDP and 
other authorities. They help illustrate the historic and ongoing complicity 
of institutions, policies, and practices of the powerful in the misery of the 
dispossessed. As such, these examples, like the socioeconomic statistics, 
also support the case for collective international political responsibility for 
endemic global poverty and growing inequality. They should give urgency 
to the task of finding a mechanism for holding accountable those who are 
complicit or who fail to act. 
3. From Political Responsibility To Legal Responsibility 
A fuller discussion of the form and substance of proposed legal 
accountability will not be presented here. However, an outline is offered 
with full appreciation of the political reality that the rich and powerful 
 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. See generally PAKENHAM, supra note 20; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9; STEWART & AMMAN, 
supra note 151. 
 262. French, supra note 259. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Taylor Convicted of Sierra Leone Crimes, supra note 216. 
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have no real incentives to take on this responsibility and that the poor have 
no means of making them do so. Increasingly, law in the international 
context seems to matter least where it should matter most. The quick and 
spectacular demise of the international right to development movement, 
outside of academic circles, provides ample testimony to this reality.267  
In a 1982 address to the U.N. General Assembly entitled, “No 
Development Without Peace, No Peace Without Development,” 
Ambassador Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria observed: 
In 1980 fifty million human beings perished from hunger. Although 
it gave rise to no general surge of indignation, this was surely a 
holocaust on a planetary scale. The Second World War took five 
years to reach similarly macabre results. Non-assistance to peoples 
in peril may indeed be the proper term to use when more than 500 
billion dollars are earmarked for world wide military expenditure, 
while the report Global 2000 . . . informs us that the amount of grain 
necessary to eliminate malnutrition in the world could be purchased 
for the price of five submarines.268 
In his speech, Ambassador Bedjaoui argued that, “under-development, like 
war, is not foreordained. Under-development is the product of an 
organized system of domination and exploitation. That system runs 
counter to the hopes for prosperity harbored by two thirds of mankind. It is 
a denial of their legitimate right to development.”269 He urged “a 
democratic dialogue” that would foster “a new political and economic 
world for our times.”270  
 
 
 267. See Declaration On the Right To Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 
(Dec. 4, 1986); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Right to Development on 
Its 8th Sess., Feb. 26–Mar. 2, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/47 (Mar. 13, 2007). See also Georges Abi-
Saab, The Legal Formulation of a Right To Development, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKSHOP 167 (René-Jean 
Dupuy ed., 1980); Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right To Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS (M. Bedjaoui ed., 1991); Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night, 
27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755 (2005). But see Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and 
Politics of the Right To Development, 15 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 473 (1985). All of these sources were first 
obtained from the valuable section on human right and development in STEINER ET AL., supra note 
217. 
 268. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Address to the 36th Session of the U.N. General Assembly: No 
Development Without Peace, No Peace Without Development, reprinted in 27 INT’L FOUND. FOR 
DEV. ALTERNATIVES DOSSIER, 55, 55–56 (1982), available at http://www.dhf.uu.se/ifda/readerdocs/ 
pdf/doss_27.pdf. 
 269. Id. at 56–57. 
 270. Id. at 61. See also Declaration On The Establishment of A New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974); Johan Galtung, The New 
International Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach, 4 ALTERNATIVES 463 (1979). 
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The three-plus decades since his address have not been kind to the 
vision of global community he advocated for on behalf of many in the less 
developed world. The absolute total of dispossessed, hungry, diseased, 
dying, oppressed, and barely surviving has actually increased even if the 
proportions have remained generally stable. According to Thomas Pogge: 
Roughly one third of all human deaths, some 18 million annually, 
are due to poverty-related causes, easily preventable through better 
nutrition, safe drinking water, mosquito nets, re-hydration packs, 
vaccines and other medicines. This sums up to 300 million deaths in 
just the 17 years since the end of the Cold War—many more than 
were caused by all the wars, civil wars, and government repression 
of the entire 20th Century.271 
The time has come to push the political dialogue over collective 
responsibility to a serious consideration of how the world community 
could be held accountable not only for a narrow category of spectacular 
assaults on humanity but also for an endemic global culture of violence 
and the extreme deprivations that nurture and protect such depredations. 
The move from political responsibility to legal responsibility could be 
justified on the basis of post-Cold War practices of the international 
community and the sense of legal obligation that has developed from 
them. The obligations contained in the U.N. Charter and core human rights 
agreements also support this duty. Together, these sources could be the 
foundation for a customary law justification for much broader obligations 
to assist.272 Thomas Pogge, for one, has rejected the view that the 
responsibility of the rich countries to the poor ones lies in charity as 
opposed to demands for justice.273 He argues for a quasi-legal obligation 
of the rich countries derived from Articles 25 (1) and 28 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).274  
 
 
 271. Thomas Pogge, Poverty and Human Rights, in THE ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286, 286 
(Rhona K.M. Smith & Christien van den Anker eds., 2006) (citing U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND [UNICEF], 
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2005 (2004), available at http://www.unicef.org/ 
sowc05/english/sowc05.pdf), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/poverty/expert/docs/ 
Thomas_Pogge_Summary.pdf. 
 272. Similar customary law arguments are already being made for R2P. E.g., Eaton, supra note 
105, at 801–04. 
 273. Pogge, supra note 271. 
 274. UDHR, supra note 14, art. 25, para. 1 (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
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However, current interpretation of the legal effects of the UDHR 
weakens such arguments.275 It must also be conceded at this point that 
there is insufficient legal basis for finding customary law obligations on 
the part of the international community to assist those in peril whether 
under the circumstances covered by the responsibility to protect doctrine 
or a under a proposed broader duty to assist doctrine.276 The work being 
done to hold multinational corporations more accountable for their 
contributions to violence and misery in poor countries is valuable, but not 
exactly on point.277 The broad communal obligations that are the focus of 
this Article would require a negotiated international agreement with 
 
 
control.”); id. art. 28 (“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”). 
 275. The UDHR, like all similar international declarations, is not considered legally binding under 
international law. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 294 (6th ed. Oxford 1963). However, as 
Brierly noted, “Nevertheless, it has gained considerable authority as a general guide to the content of 
fundamental rights and freedoms . . . .” Id. 
 276. An international customary law obligation would require evidence of general and consistent 
practice on the part of rich nations to provide assistance to poorer nations done from a sense of legal 
obligation on the part of rich countries. Such evidence is absent both in the actions of states and in 
their binding international legal commitments. Charity, bilateral and multilateral development 
assistance, and grand international agendas are not done with any sense of legal obligation presently. 
“Custom is generally considered to have two elements: state practice and opinio juris. State practice 
refers to a general and consistent practice by states, while opinio juris means that the practice is 
followed out of a belief of legal obligation.” Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001). See 
also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055.  
 277. See, e.g., Owen Bonheimer et al., Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, U.N. Guiding Principles for 
Business & Human Rights: Issuance of Ruggie Principles Portends Increasing Need for Multinational 
Businesses to Focus on Human Rights Compliance, STEPTOE.COM (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.step 
toe.com/publications-newsletter-172.html. Professor Ruggie’s efforts are oriented toward getting 
existing systems and processes to incorporate human rights concerns. They are not revolutionary in 
any sense: 
Professor Ruggie’s Guiding Principles are the product of six years of research commissioned 
by former U.N. Secretary General Annan in July 2005. In June 2008, Professor Ruggie 
presented a report titled Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
Rights to the U.N. Human Rights Council (the “Framework”). The Framework consists of 
three core principles: 1) the duty of States to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business enterprises; 2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; 
and 3) the need for greater access by victims to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies. 
The U.N. Human Rights Council welcomed the Framework and requested that Professor 
Ruggie offer “concrete and practical recommendations” for its implementation. In November 
2010, Professor Ruggie responded by issuing a draft of the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (“Draft Principles”). The Draft Principles were open for comment for 
three months and received approximately 90 submissions from the business community, 
NGOs, international organizations, academics, and governments. After considering these 
written submissions and engaging in consultations with various stakeholders, Professor 
Ruggie submitted the revised and final text of the Guiding Principles to the Human Rights 
Council in March 2011. 
Id.  
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appropriate consequences for breaches to attain the force of law. It should 
be conceded that employing law in this manner is not a misperception of 
the totally political nature of the endeavor. Law here is not an escape from 
politics.278 The turn to law here would merely confirm that the 
international community has reached a mature consensus over global 
responsibility that is important enough to be concretized.279 Scholars and 
policymakers concerned about the current state of global affairs should 
turn their attention to this important task.  
VI. CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING THE PROGRESSIVE VISION 
This Article has argued for resistance to apathy, resignation, or 
ambivalence in the face of a revolving panorama of atrocities, persistent 
human misery, and the violence that accompanies and sustains it. This 
Article has argued for a binding collective international obligation, not just 
a moral duty or a (permissible) right under international law, to intervene 
to stop atrocities, and to ameliorate everyday extreme suffering that is 
readily within our capacity to affect. The Article argues that this obligation 
should not rest on charity but on a foundation of international 
responsibility that gives those victimized by a failure to act or by 
inadequate action recourse against the international community as a whole. 
Over a century ago, a trenchant observer of the processes of 
transnational human interactions wrote: 
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away 
from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses 
than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. 
What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a 
sentimental pretence but an idea . . . .280 
The writer, Joseph Conrad, employed the device of multiple, 
interconnected, and unresolved journeys through what he described as the 
Darkness, to push all of us to meditate on our collective responsibilities for 
 
 
 278. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2006). 
 279. Stanley Hoffmann makes the point about what law does in these contexts: “law is not merely 
a policy among others in the hands of statesmen, [but] a tool with very special characteristics and 
roles . . . . Most important is the fact that law has a distinct solemnity of effects: it is a normative 
instrument that creates rights and duties. . . . it enshrines, elevates, consecrates the interests or ideas it 
embodies.” Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International 
Relations, 57 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 26, 34–35 (1963).  
 280. CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, supra note 42, at 7. 
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human suffering.281 Conrad’s world was forged as a percipient witness to 
imperialism in then Belgian Congo and other places.282 He reminds us that 
a lot of evil has happened everywhere, including places where humans 
have claimed good intentions and embraced the civilizing mission. Evil, 
which must include structured misery, is not the property of just the 
particular location or time period that he puts to focus.283 Human beings, 
he insists, need to look within themselves to find “The Heart of 
Darkness.”284 The motivations, pronouncements, and even actions of those 
presiding over grand processes of progress cannot be relied upon to 
provide a true compass to the consequences of even the most benign 
sounding or appearing conduct. After all, the infamous Mr. Kurtz was also 
an agent for the fictional humanitarian institution, the “International 
Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs.”285 Generations later, 
another writer, Stieg Larsson, expressed similar sentiments, “There are no 
innocents. There are, however, different degrees of responsibility.”286 The 
essential question, then, is the degree of responsibility possessed by all, 
including those who seem to be outside of evil but with the knowledge and 
means to act, for the abject conditions of those who just happen to 
constitute the least among us. 
 
 
 281. Several of Conrad’s other works captured this concern about collective responsibility as well 
as the human incapacity to properly assess motivations, understand complexity and devise enduring 
and just solutions. See JOSEPH CONRAD, NOSTROMO (1904) and JOSEPH CONRAD, LORD JIM (1900). 
 282. For more on the atrocities in Congo and collective international responsibility for them, see 
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9. For an examination of the roots of broader international responsibility 
toward sub-Saharan Africa, see also PAKENHAM, supra note 20, and HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE 
TRADE (1997). 
 283. Conrad began the story with the narrator, Marlowe, aboard “The Nellie, a cruising yawl,” in 
the company of several other men, enjoying an excursion on the Thames river in London. Conrad 
seemed eager to alert the reader that this was not just a story about another place and time by 
emphasizing the ever present danger of “darkness” enveloping peace: “The air was dark above 
Gravesend, and farther back still seemed condensed into a mournful gloom, brooding motionless over 
the biggest, and the greatest, town on Earth.” CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, supra note 42, at 3. 
Marlowe’s first sentence emphasized this insight: “And this also, said Marlowe suddenly, has been one 
of the dark places on earth.” Id. at 5. Marlowe continued along the same vein, setting the stage, before 
mentioning his experience in the Congo: “I was thinking of very old times, when the Romans first 
came here, nineteen hundred years ago—the other day. . . . We live in the flicker—may it last as long 
as the old earth keeps rolling! But darkness was here yesterday. . . . They were men enough to face the 
darkness” Id. at 6–7. For Conrad, humans in the end must recognize that we have “to live in the midst 
of the incomprehensible, which is also detestable.” Id. at 7. See also generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE 
PLAGUE (1947). 
 284. CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, supra note 42. 
 285. “All Europe contributed to the making of Mr. Kurtz; and by and bye I learned that, most 
appropriately, the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs . . . .” Id. at 61. 
 286. LARSSON, supra note 218, at 323. 
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The foundation of our collective international responsibility begins and 
ends with recognition of our common humanity. Recognition of our 
common humanity is all we should need to understand that there has to be 
a duty to act, to intervene, not just to prevent atrocities, narrowly defined, 
but also to alleviate the conditions that give rise to such depravities in the 
first place. If one should need a more precise reason, it must be that failure 
to act inexorably works to cheapen the value of common humanity. More 
than six decades after the end of the Second World War and the founding 
of the United Nations, we do not need further examples of the 
consequences of such failures. 
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